金融危机期间的企业信息披露行为：韩国的证据

IF 6.1 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Stability Pub Date : 2024-07-06 DOI:10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101298

Yeonghyeon Kim , Junyong Lee , Kyounghun Lee , Frederick Dongchuhl Oh

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们根据韩国金融危机期间企业状态的变化研究了企业的信息披露模式。利用 1995 年至 2019 年韩国上市公司的面板数据，我们首先证实，在危机期间，当资产收益率变化为正数（负数）时，企业会透明（不透明）地披露信息。此外，我们还检验了这些披露模式会增加债务融资，但对股权融资无效。最后，对于拥有内部资本市场的企业集团，我们发现内部资本接收者会透明（不透明）地披露其状态的负（正）变化。相比之下，提供者则表现出相反的模式。(JEL G01, G30, M40)

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Corporate disclosure behavior during financial crises: Evidence from Korea

We examine corporate disclosure patterns according to changes in firm states during financial crises in Korea. Using panel data on Korean listed firms from 1995 to 2019, we first confirm that they transparently (opaquely) disclose information when the change in return on assets is positive (negative) during crises. Moreover, we check that these disclosure patterns increase debt financing but are ineffective for equity financing. Finally, for chaebols with internal capital markets, we find that internal capital receivers provide transparent (opaque) disclosure of negative (positive) changes in their states. By contrast, providers show the opposite patterns. (JEL G01, G30, M40)

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Stability Multiple-

CiteScore

7.70

自引率

9.30%

发文量

审稿时长

34 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Stability provides an international forum for rigorous theoretical and empirical macro and micro economic and financial analysis of the causes, management, resolution and preventions of financial crises, including banking, securities market, payments and currency crises. The primary focus is on applied research that would be useful in affecting public policy with respect to financial stability. Thus, the Journal seeks to promote interaction among researchers, policy-makers and practitioners to identify potential risks to financial stability and develop means for preventing, mitigating or managing these risks both within and across countries.