游戏激励机制实验测试

IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Sheheryar Banuri , Katarína Danková , Philip Keefer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

近年来,许多组织都在努力引入游戏激励机制,以提高员工的努力程度和用户参与度。然而,人们对这些激励措施并不十分了解,因此缺乏系统控制的实证证据来说明其效果以及与其他激励形式之间的相互作用。我们首次利用真实努力实验室实验对游戏激励机制进行了全面测试,实验中的标准实验室任务经过调整,允许加入游戏激励机制。我们测试了这些激励机制在两种外在激励机制(无条件工资和计件工资)下的效果。此外,我们还测量了受试者的任务动机,并探讨了与内在(基于任务的)激励措施之间的相互作用。我们报告了三个主要发现:第一,当付出努力的外在激励较弱时,博弈激励会增加努力。当外在激励较强时,游戏激励对努力没有额外影响,这表明多种激励形式的收益递减。最后,某些形式的游戏激励能成功地提高任务动机最弱的人的努力程度,这一特性与外在激励相似。本文讨论了游戏激励对企业实施游戏激励的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An experimental test of gaming incentives

In recent years, many organizations have undertaken efforts to introduce gaming incentives in order to enhance employee effort and user engagement. However, these incentives are not well understood, and subsequently there is a dearth of systematically controlled empirical evidence on their effects, as well as their interaction with other forms of motivation. We present the first comprehensive test of gaming incentives using a real effort lab experiment with a standard lab task adapted to allow the inclusion of gaming incentives. We test the effect of these incentives under two types of extrinsic incentives, an unconditional wage, and a piece rate. In addition, we also measure subject task motivation and explore interaction with intrinsic (task based) incentives. We report three main findings: first, gaming incentives increase effort when extrinsic incentives to exert effort are weak. When extrinsic incentives are strong, gaming incentives have no additional impact on effort, showcasing diminishing returns to multiple forms of incentives. Finally, some forms of gaming incentives are successful in increasing effort among the least task motivated, a property that is similar to extrinsic incentives. Implications for organizations seeking to implement gaming incentives are discussed.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
9.10%
发文量
392
期刊介绍: The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.
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