怀疑论的自然化

IF 0.4 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
METAPHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI:10.1111/meta.12696
Marc Jiménez-Rolland
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引用次数: 0

摘要

自然主义是一种极具影响力的观点,它被理解为哲学应与科学保持连续性。然而,它对认识论的影响却相当奇怪。许多人认为,自然主义认识论可以避开传统的怀疑论挑战。这通常被视为一种优势,但也让人质疑它是否属于对知识的哲学探究。本文认为,在自然化认识论中,怀疑论挑战可以说是对认识论乐观主义的蔑视,而且存在着独特的自然主义怀疑论形式。为此,本文概述了许多将认识论自然化的尝试所依据的一些假设。它将这些方法与传统认识论进行了对比,并指出了自然主义认识论学者提出的驳回传统怀疑论挑战的理由。接下来,它论证了怀疑论的问题可以在自然主义的背景下得到合理的阐述。最后,它认为有一些独特的自然主义策略来论证怀疑论,并诊断了自然主义面对这些怀疑论挑战的前景。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Naturalizing skepticism

Naturalizing skepticism

Naturalism, construed as the idea that philosophy should be continuous with science, is a highly influential view. Its consequences for epistemology, however, are rather odd. Many believe that naturalized epistemology allows eschewing traditional skeptical challenges. This is often seen as an advantage; but it also calls into question its claim of belonging to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge. This paper argues that skeptical challenges can be stated to defy epistemic optimism within naturalized epistemology, and that there are distinctively naturalistic forms of skepticism. To that end, it outlines some assumptions underlying many attempts to naturalize epistemology. It contrasts these approaches to traditional epistemology and identifies the reasons offered by naturalistic epistemologists to dismiss traditional skeptical challenges. Next, it argues that the problem of skepticism can be sensibly stated within a naturalistic setting. Finally, it contends that there are distinctively naturalistic strategies to argue for skepticism and diagnoses the prospects of naturalism vis-à-vis these kinds of skeptical challenges.

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来源期刊
METAPHILOSOPHY
METAPHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: Metaphilosophy publishes articles and reviews books stressing considerations about philosophy and particular schools, methods, or fields of philosophy. The intended scope is very broad: no method, field, or school is excluded.
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