知识描述之谜

Noûs Pub Date : 2024-07-05 DOI:10.1111/nous.12515
Brian Porter, Kelli Barr, Abdellatif Bencherifa, Wesley Buckwalter, Yasuo Deguchi, Emanuele Fabiano, Takaaki Hashimoto, Julia Halamova, Joshua Homan, Kaori Karasawa, Martin Kanovsky, Hakjin Kim, Jordan Kiper, Minha Lee, Xiaofei Liu, Veli Mitova, Rukmini Bhaya, Ljiljana Pantovic, Pablo Quintanilla, Josien Reijer, Pedro Romero, Purmina Singh, Salma Tber, Daniel Wilkenfeld, Stephen Stich, Clark Barrett, Edouard Machery
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引用次数: 0

摘要

哲学家们认为,利害关系会影响知识:如果利害关系较小,一定量的证据就足以获得知识,但如果利害关系较大,则不然。相比之下,关于利害关系对普通知识描述的影响的实证研究则在方法论上存在分歧:"固定证据 "提示很少发现利害关系的影响,而 "寻求证据 "提示则总是发现利害关系的影响。我们在一项跨文化研究中同时使用了 "固定证据 "和 "寻求证据 "两种提示方法,研究对象是 11 个国家的 17 个不同人群,使用 14 种语言。我们的研究是首次跨文化使用 "证据搜寻 "提示,其中包括一些以前未经测试的人群(包括土著居民)。在不同文化中,我们的证据固定提示没有发现利害关系效应的证据,但我们的证据寻求提示却发现了利害关系效应。我们认为,这些不同的结果揭示了民间认识论中的一个矛盾:人们关于何时应该归因于知识的信念与他们归因于知识的实际做法大相径庭。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A puzzle about knowledge ascriptions
Philosophers have argued that stakes affect knowledge: a given amount of evidence may suffice for knowledge if the stakes are low, but not if the stakes are high. By contrast, empirical work on the influence of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascriptions has been divided along methodological lines: “evidence‐fixed” prompts rarely find stakes effects, while “evidence‐seeking” prompts consistently find them. We present a cross‐cultural study using both evidence‐fixed and evidence‐seeking prompts with a diverse sample of 17 populations in 11 countries, speaking 14 languages. Our study is the first to use an evidence‐seeking prompt cross‐culturally, and includes several previously untested populations (including indigenous populations). Across cultures, we do not find evidence of a stakes effect with our evidence‐fixed prompt, but do with our evidence‐seeking prompt. We argue that the divergent results reveal a tension within folk epistemology: people's beliefs about when it is appropriate to ascribe knowledge differ significantly from their actual practice in ascribing knowledge.
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