{"title":"衡量中国农村土地租赁市场的交易成本:事前讨价还价与事后违约不确定性和地点特殊性相关联","authors":"Ziyan Yang","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.022","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>I measure the monetary value of ex-ante bargaining costs associated with China’s rural land rental market, confirming the previously unverified existence of transaction costs in this market. I demonstrate that the ex-ante bargaining costs associated with contractual formality represent the main transaction costs that hinder market progress. In a three-step theory, I model the process through which transaction costs are generated. First, uncertainty regarding ex-post contract violations caused by non-agricultural income shocks and location specificity in China’s fragmented farmland results in conflicting partner preferences. Second, the compromise mechanism that facilitates efficient bargaining makes the agent facing lower compromise costs in a transaction more likely to compromise. Third, ex-ante bargaining costs are generated in inefficient bargaining when theoretically predicted agents refuse to compromise. Using a subsample of data introduced in Yang (2020), I find that ex-ante bargaining costs are 126.5 RMB and 35.4 RMB per mu per year, respectively, for renting-out agents and renting-in agents who refuse to compromise in contract negotiations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48409,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Measuring transaction costs in China’s rural land rental market: Ex-ante bargaining associated with ex-post contract-violation uncertainty and location specificity\",\"authors\":\"Ziyan Yang\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.022\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>I measure the monetary value of ex-ante bargaining costs associated with China’s rural land rental market, confirming the previously unverified existence of transaction costs in this market. I demonstrate that the ex-ante bargaining costs associated with contractual formality represent the main transaction costs that hinder market progress. In a three-step theory, I model the process through which transaction costs are generated. First, uncertainty regarding ex-post contract violations caused by non-agricultural income shocks and location specificity in China’s fragmented farmland results in conflicting partner preferences. Second, the compromise mechanism that facilitates efficient bargaining makes the agent facing lower compromise costs in a transaction more likely to compromise. Third, ex-ante bargaining costs are generated in inefficient bargaining when theoretically predicted agents refuse to compromise. Using a subsample of data introduced in Yang (2020), I find that ex-ante bargaining costs are 126.5 RMB and 35.4 RMB per mu per year, respectively, for renting-out agents and renting-in agents who refuse to compromise in contract negotiations.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48409,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124002403\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268124002403","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Measuring transaction costs in China’s rural land rental market: Ex-ante bargaining associated with ex-post contract-violation uncertainty and location specificity
I measure the monetary value of ex-ante bargaining costs associated with China’s rural land rental market, confirming the previously unverified existence of transaction costs in this market. I demonstrate that the ex-ante bargaining costs associated with contractual formality represent the main transaction costs that hinder market progress. In a three-step theory, I model the process through which transaction costs are generated. First, uncertainty regarding ex-post contract violations caused by non-agricultural income shocks and location specificity in China’s fragmented farmland results in conflicting partner preferences. Second, the compromise mechanism that facilitates efficient bargaining makes the agent facing lower compromise costs in a transaction more likely to compromise. Third, ex-ante bargaining costs are generated in inefficient bargaining when theoretically predicted agents refuse to compromise. Using a subsample of data introduced in Yang (2020), I find that ex-ante bargaining costs are 126.5 RMB and 35.4 RMB per mu per year, respectively, for renting-out agents and renting-in agents who refuse to compromise in contract negotiations.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.