Xin Hu, Ian McCarthy, K Robin Yabroff, Wen You, Joseph Lipscomb, Ilana Graetz
{"title":"医疗保险基于医疗点的支付政策、医生执业特点与肿瘤医生垂直整合之间的关系。","authors":"Xin Hu, Ian McCarthy, K Robin Yabroff, Wen You, Joseph Lipscomb, Ilana Graetz","doi":"10.1200/OP.24.00091","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Purpose: </strong>Medicare's differential payments for services delivered in physician offices versus hospital outpatient settings incentivize hospital-physician integration (ie, vertical integration) across many specialties, but evidence for oncologists is mixed. We examined the association of Medicare site-based payment policy and physician practice characteristics, including service volume and diversity, with vertical integration among oncologists in 2013-2019.</p><p><strong>Methods: </strong>Using the Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data and Medicare Data on Provider Practice and Specialty in 2013-2019, we extracted nonintegrated medical/hematologic oncologists (hereafter oncologists) in 2013 and followed them through 2019. We quantified the incentives from Medicare site-based payment policy using the hospital-office ratio-total Medicare payments if all services were delivered in the hospital outpatient department (HOPD) versus physician office. Vertical integration was defined as billing >10% of services to HOPD in a year. Multivariable linear probability regressions estimated the association between hospital-office ratio and vertical integration in 2014-2019 with and without accounting for provider characteristics.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>In 2013, the average hospital-office ratio was 1.63, which increased to 1.99 in 2018. A 25th-to-75th percentile increase in the hospital-office ratio was negatively associated with integration (-1.01 percentage points [ppts], 95% CI = -1.45 to -0.57, <i>p</i> < .001) not accounting for physician practice characteristics; this association was attenuated (-0.30 ppts, 95% CI = -0.67 to 0.07, <i>p</i> = .11) after adjusting for these characteristics. Higher baseline (ie, 2013) service volume (Quartile4 <i>v</i> Quartile1 = -3.00 ppts, 95% CI = -4.42 to -1.59, <i>p</i> < .001), more diverse services (Quartile4 <i>v</i> Quartile1 = -3.55 ppts, 95% CI = -4.97 to -2.13, <i>p</i> < .001), and urban location (-5.23 ppts, 95% CI = -6.89 to -3.57, <i>p</i> < .001) were more strongly associated with vertical integration.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: </strong>Compared to Medicare site-based payment policy, oncologists' practice characteristics emerged as more potent factors for integration and should be considered to ensure the intended impacts of site-based payment reform. Our finding raises questions about the effectiveness of ongoing movements toward site-neutral payment for drug administration services to deter vertical integration in oncology.</p>","PeriodicalId":14612,"journal":{"name":"JCO oncology practice","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Association Between Medicare Site-Based Payment Policy, Physician Practice Characteristics, and Vertical Integration Among Oncologists.\",\"authors\":\"Xin Hu, Ian McCarthy, K Robin Yabroff, Wen You, Joseph Lipscomb, Ilana Graetz\",\"doi\":\"10.1200/OP.24.00091\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><strong>Purpose: </strong>Medicare's differential payments for services delivered in physician offices versus hospital outpatient settings incentivize hospital-physician integration (ie, vertical integration) across many specialties, but evidence for oncologists is mixed. We examined the association of Medicare site-based payment policy and physician practice characteristics, including service volume and diversity, with vertical integration among oncologists in 2013-2019.</p><p><strong>Methods: </strong>Using the Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data and Medicare Data on Provider Practice and Specialty in 2013-2019, we extracted nonintegrated medical/hematologic oncologists (hereafter oncologists) in 2013 and followed them through 2019. We quantified the incentives from Medicare site-based payment policy using the hospital-office ratio-total Medicare payments if all services were delivered in the hospital outpatient department (HOPD) versus physician office. Vertical integration was defined as billing >10% of services to HOPD in a year. Multivariable linear probability regressions estimated the association between hospital-office ratio and vertical integration in 2014-2019 with and without accounting for provider characteristics.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>In 2013, the average hospital-office ratio was 1.63, which increased to 1.99 in 2018. A 25th-to-75th percentile increase in the hospital-office ratio was negatively associated with integration (-1.01 percentage points [ppts], 95% CI = -1.45 to -0.57, <i>p</i> < .001) not accounting for physician practice characteristics; this association was attenuated (-0.30 ppts, 95% CI = -0.67 to 0.07, <i>p</i> = .11) after adjusting for these characteristics. Higher baseline (ie, 2013) service volume (Quartile4 <i>v</i> Quartile1 = -3.00 ppts, 95% CI = -4.42 to -1.59, <i>p</i> < .001), more diverse services (Quartile4 <i>v</i> Quartile1 = -3.55 ppts, 95% CI = -4.97 to -2.13, <i>p</i> < .001), and urban location (-5.23 ppts, 95% CI = -6.89 to -3.57, <i>p</i> < .001) were more strongly associated with vertical integration.</p><p><strong>Conclusion: </strong>Compared to Medicare site-based payment policy, oncologists' practice characteristics emerged as more potent factors for integration and should be considered to ensure the intended impacts of site-based payment reform. Our finding raises questions about the effectiveness of ongoing movements toward site-neutral payment for drug administration services to deter vertical integration in oncology.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":14612,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"JCO oncology practice\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"JCO oncology practice\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"3\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1200/OP.24.00091\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"医学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ONCOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JCO oncology practice","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1200/OP.24.00091","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ONCOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
目的:医疗保险对在医生诊室和医院门诊提供服务的不同支付方式激励了许多专科的医院-医生一体化(即纵向一体化),但肿瘤学家的证据却不尽相同。我们研究了 2013-2019 年医疗保险基于医疗机构的支付政策和医生执业特点(包括服务量和多样性)与肿瘤医生纵向整合的关系:利用 2013-2019 年医疗保险提供者使用和支付数据以及医疗保险提供者实践和专业数据,我们提取了 2013 年非整合的内科/血液肿瘤学家(以下简称肿瘤学家),并对他们进行了跟踪调查,直至 2019 年。我们使用医院-诊室比率(如果所有服务都在医院门诊部 (HOPD) 和医生诊室提供,则医疗保险支付总额)量化了医疗保险基于诊室的支付政策所带来的激励。垂直整合的定义是在一年内向医院门诊部收取的服务费>10%。多变量线性概率回归估算了 2014-2019 年医院-诊室比率与纵向整合之间的关联,并考虑和不考虑医疗服务提供者的特征:2013年,医院与诊所的平均比例为1.63,2018年增至1.99。在不考虑医生执业特征的情况下,医院-诊室比率从第 25 个百分位数到第 75 个百分位数的增加与整合呈负相关(-1.01 个百分点 [pps],95% CI = -1.45 到 -0.57,p < .001);在调整这些特征后,这种相关性减弱(-0.30 个百分点,95% CI = -0.67 到 0.07,p = .11)。较高的基线(即 2013 年)服务量(Quartile4 v Quartile1 = -3.00 ppts, 95% CI = -4.42 to -1.59, p < .001)、更多样化的服务(Quartile4 v Quartile1 = -3.55 ppts, 95% CI = -4.97 to -2.13, p < .001)和城市位置(-5.23 ppts, 95% CI = -6.89 to -3.57,p < .001)与纵向整合的关联性更强:结论:与医疗保险以医疗机构为基础的支付政策相比,肿瘤医生的执业特点成为更有力的整合因素,应加以考虑以确保以医疗机构为基础的支付改革的预期效果。我们的研究结果提出了一个问题,即目前正在进行的药物管理服务中性支付运动能否有效阻止肿瘤科的纵向整合。
Association Between Medicare Site-Based Payment Policy, Physician Practice Characteristics, and Vertical Integration Among Oncologists.
Purpose: Medicare's differential payments for services delivered in physician offices versus hospital outpatient settings incentivize hospital-physician integration (ie, vertical integration) across many specialties, but evidence for oncologists is mixed. We examined the association of Medicare site-based payment policy and physician practice characteristics, including service volume and diversity, with vertical integration among oncologists in 2013-2019.
Methods: Using the Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data and Medicare Data on Provider Practice and Specialty in 2013-2019, we extracted nonintegrated medical/hematologic oncologists (hereafter oncologists) in 2013 and followed them through 2019. We quantified the incentives from Medicare site-based payment policy using the hospital-office ratio-total Medicare payments if all services were delivered in the hospital outpatient department (HOPD) versus physician office. Vertical integration was defined as billing >10% of services to HOPD in a year. Multivariable linear probability regressions estimated the association between hospital-office ratio and vertical integration in 2014-2019 with and without accounting for provider characteristics.
Results: In 2013, the average hospital-office ratio was 1.63, which increased to 1.99 in 2018. A 25th-to-75th percentile increase in the hospital-office ratio was negatively associated with integration (-1.01 percentage points [ppts], 95% CI = -1.45 to -0.57, p < .001) not accounting for physician practice characteristics; this association was attenuated (-0.30 ppts, 95% CI = -0.67 to 0.07, p = .11) after adjusting for these characteristics. Higher baseline (ie, 2013) service volume (Quartile4 v Quartile1 = -3.00 ppts, 95% CI = -4.42 to -1.59, p < .001), more diverse services (Quartile4 v Quartile1 = -3.55 ppts, 95% CI = -4.97 to -2.13, p < .001), and urban location (-5.23 ppts, 95% CI = -6.89 to -3.57, p < .001) were more strongly associated with vertical integration.
Conclusion: Compared to Medicare site-based payment policy, oncologists' practice characteristics emerged as more potent factors for integration and should be considered to ensure the intended impacts of site-based payment reform. Our finding raises questions about the effectiveness of ongoing movements toward site-neutral payment for drug administration services to deter vertical integration in oncology.