拥有决策:人工智能决策支持与属性差距。

IF 2.7 2区 哲学 Q1 ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Jannik Zeiser
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引用次数: 0

摘要

长期以来,人工智能(AI)一直被认为是对责任的挑战。这方面的讨论大多围绕机器人展开,如自主武器或自动驾驶汽车,我们可以说对机器的行为缺乏控制,因此很难确定一个可以承担责任的代理人。然而,当今的大多数人工智能都是基于机器学习技术,这种技术并不独立行动,而是充当决策支持工具,自动分析数据,帮助人类代理人做出更好的决策。我认为,决策支持工具对责任提出的挑战超出了我们所熟悉的为类似代理系统的行为找人指责或惩罚的问题。也就是说,决策支持工具给我们所谓的 "决策所有权"(decision ownership)带来了一个问题:我们很难确定哪些人类代理可以将反映在决策中的价值判断归因于他们。根据最近关于责任及其各个方面的哲学文献,我认为这主要是一个可归属性问题,而不是责任问题。这种特殊的责任问题有不同的形式和程度,最明显的是当人工智能提供直接的行动建议时,但也有不那么明显的情况,即人工智能仅仅提供了做出决策所依据的描述性信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Owning Decisions: AI Decision-Support and the Attributability-Gap.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has long been recognised as a challenge to responsibility. Much of this discourse has been framed around robots, such as autonomous weapons or self-driving cars, where we arguably lack control over a machine's behaviour and therefore struggle to identify an agent that can be held accountable. However, most of today's AI is based on machine-learning technology that does not act on its own, but rather serves as a decision-support tool, automatically analysing data to help human agents make better decisions. I argue that decision-support tools pose a challenge to responsibility that goes beyond the familiar problem of finding someone to blame or punish for the behaviour of agent-like systems. Namely, they pose a problem for what we might call "decision ownership": they make it difficult to identify human agents to whom we can attribute value-judgements that are reflected in decisions. Drawing on recent philosophical literature on responsibility and its various facets, I argue that this is primarily a problem of attributability rather than of accountability. This particular responsibility problem comes in different forms and degrees, most obviously when an AI provides direct recommendations for actions, but also, less obviously, when it provides mere descriptive information on the basis of which a decision is made.

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来源期刊
Science and Engineering Ethics
Science and Engineering Ethics 综合性期刊-工程:综合
CiteScore
10.70
自引率
5.40%
发文量
54
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: Science and Engineering Ethics is an international multidisciplinary journal dedicated to exploring ethical issues associated with science and engineering, covering professional education, research and practice as well as the effects of technological innovations and research findings on society. While the focus of this journal is on science and engineering, contributions from a broad range of disciplines, including social sciences and humanities, are welcomed. Areas of interest include, but are not limited to, ethics of new and emerging technologies, research ethics, computer ethics, energy ethics, animals and human subjects ethics, ethics education in science and engineering, ethics in design, biomedical ethics, values in technology and innovation. We welcome contributions that deal with these issues from an international perspective, particularly from countries that are underrepresented in these discussions.
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