Eugen Dimant , Fabio Galeotti , Marie Claire Villeval
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Motivated information acquisition and social norm formation
We investigate how individuals select sources of information about peers’ behavior and normative views, and the influence of this social information on individual behavior and both empirical and normative expectations. This is explored through two experiments (N=1,945; N=2,414) using a lying game, with and without known political identification. Our findings reveal a self-serving bias in the selection of information sources, with a preference for lenient sources (i.e., those presenting more tolerant empirical or normative information about lying), particularly when these sources align with an individual’s political identity. We observe that being exposed to information that suggests lying is more socially acceptable increases lying behavior. Additionally, while people’s normative expectations are not swayed by observing their peers’ actions, these expectations are influenced by information about what peers believe is the right thing to do, underscoring the role of normative information in shaping social norms.
期刊介绍:
The European Economic Review (EER) started publishing in 1969 as the first research journal specifically aiming to contribute to the development and application of economics as a science in Europe. As a broad-based professional and international journal, the EER welcomes submissions of applied and theoretical research papers in all fields of economics. The aim of the EER is to contribute to the development of the science of economics and its applications, as well as to improve communication between academic researchers, teachers and policy makers across the European continent and beyond.