{"title":"如果你能读懂我的心关于心灵史和其他问题","authors":"Chris Lorenz","doi":"10.1111/hith.12357","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In <i>The Primacy of Method in Historical Research: Philosophy of History and the Perspective of Meaning</i>, Jonas Ahlskog presents a critical and lucid engagement with contemporary philosophies of history and makes a sustained case for a return to the ideas of history and social science as developed by R. G. Collingwood and Peter Winch. What philosophy needs again is, first, a recognition of the “primacy of method”—that is, the insight that <i>what</i> one knows about reality depends on <i>how</i> one knows it. Second, philosophers need to take “the duality of method” seriously again and to recognize that the modes of explanation in the human sciences and the natural sciences are categorically different from each other—especially now that this difference has been blurred in recent debates about the Anthropocene. Ahlskog's book is thus also a contribution to the classical debate about causal explanation versus meaningful understanding. On closer analysis, however, Ahlskog's “untimely meditations” on “historical method” suffer from an insufficient engagement with counterarguments. A first line of critique challenges the idea that human action cannot be explained causally. A second line of critique challenges the idea that all aspects of human action can be “understood,” because the unintended aspects and consequences of individual actions cannot. These require causal explanation. A third line of critique concerns Ahlskog's denial of the fundamental plurality of ideas of history and the social sciences. Squeezing this plurality into one philosophical mold comes at a price. Unintentionally, Ahlskog's “untimely meditations” also show that much.</p>","PeriodicalId":47473,"journal":{"name":"History and Theory","volume":"63 3","pages":"432-443"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/hith.12357","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"IF YOU COULD READ MY MIND: ON THE HISTORY OF MIND AND OTHER MATTERS\",\"authors\":\"Chris Lorenz\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/hith.12357\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>In <i>The Primacy of Method in Historical Research: Philosophy of History and the Perspective of Meaning</i>, Jonas Ahlskog presents a critical and lucid engagement with contemporary philosophies of history and makes a sustained case for a return to the ideas of history and social science as developed by R. G. Collingwood and Peter Winch. What philosophy needs again is, first, a recognition of the “primacy of method”—that is, the insight that <i>what</i> one knows about reality depends on <i>how</i> one knows it. Second, philosophers need to take “the duality of method” seriously again and to recognize that the modes of explanation in the human sciences and the natural sciences are categorically different from each other—especially now that this difference has been blurred in recent debates about the Anthropocene. Ahlskog's book is thus also a contribution to the classical debate about causal explanation versus meaningful understanding. On closer analysis, however, Ahlskog's “untimely meditations” on “historical method” suffer from an insufficient engagement with counterarguments. A first line of critique challenges the idea that human action cannot be explained causally. A second line of critique challenges the idea that all aspects of human action can be “understood,” because the unintended aspects and consequences of individual actions cannot. These require causal explanation. A third line of critique concerns Ahlskog's denial of the fundamental plurality of ideas of history and the social sciences. Squeezing this plurality into one philosophical mold comes at a price. Unintentionally, Ahlskog's “untimely meditations” also show that much.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47473,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"History and Theory\",\"volume\":\"63 3\",\"pages\":\"432-443\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/hith.12357\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"History and Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/hith.12357\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"历史学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"History and Theory","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/hith.12357","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"历史学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
在《历史研究方法的首要地位》一书中,乔纳斯-阿尔斯科格在《历史研究中方法的首要地位:历史哲学与意义的视角》一书中,乔纳斯-阿尔斯科格对当代历史哲学进行了批判性的、清晰的探讨,并提出了回归 R. G. 科林伍德和彼得-温奇提出的历史和社会科学思想的持久论据。哲学再次需要的是,首先,承认 "方法至上"--即人们对现实的认识取决于如何认识。其次,哲学家们需要再次认真对待 "方法的二重性",认识到人文科学和自然科学的解释模式截然不同--尤其是在最近关于 "人类世 "的争论中,这种差异已经变得模糊不清。因此,阿尔斯科格的书也是对关于因果解释与有意义理解的经典辩论的贡献。不过,仔细分析一下,阿尔斯科格对 "历史方法 "的 "不合时宜的沉思 "存在着对反驳不足的问题。第一种批判质疑人类行为无法用因果关系来解释的观点。第二种观点认为,人类行动的所有方面都可以被 "理解",因为个别行动的非预期方面和后果是不能被 "理解 "的。这些都需要因果解释。第三种批判是,阿尔斯科格否认历史和社会科学思想的基本多元性。将这种多元性挤进一个哲学模子是要付出代价的。无意中,阿尔斯科格的 "不合时宜的沉思 "也表明了这一点。
IF YOU COULD READ MY MIND: ON THE HISTORY OF MIND AND OTHER MATTERS
In The Primacy of Method in Historical Research: Philosophy of History and the Perspective of Meaning, Jonas Ahlskog presents a critical and lucid engagement with contemporary philosophies of history and makes a sustained case for a return to the ideas of history and social science as developed by R. G. Collingwood and Peter Winch. What philosophy needs again is, first, a recognition of the “primacy of method”—that is, the insight that what one knows about reality depends on how one knows it. Second, philosophers need to take “the duality of method” seriously again and to recognize that the modes of explanation in the human sciences and the natural sciences are categorically different from each other—especially now that this difference has been blurred in recent debates about the Anthropocene. Ahlskog's book is thus also a contribution to the classical debate about causal explanation versus meaningful understanding. On closer analysis, however, Ahlskog's “untimely meditations” on “historical method” suffer from an insufficient engagement with counterarguments. A first line of critique challenges the idea that human action cannot be explained causally. A second line of critique challenges the idea that all aspects of human action can be “understood,” because the unintended aspects and consequences of individual actions cannot. These require causal explanation. A third line of critique concerns Ahlskog's denial of the fundamental plurality of ideas of history and the social sciences. Squeezing this plurality into one philosophical mold comes at a price. Unintentionally, Ahlskog's “untimely meditations” also show that much.
期刊介绍:
History and Theory leads the way in exploring the nature of history. Prominent international thinkers contribute their reflections in the following areas: critical philosophy of history, speculative philosophy of history, historiography, history of historiography, historical methodology, critical theory, and time and culture. Related disciplines are also covered within the journal, including interactions between history and the natural and social sciences, the humanities, and psychology.