美国总统:权力与制约

IF 9.7 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Corey Brettschneider, Aidan G. Calvelli
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们应该有多担心总统会为了追求权力而违法,然后利用职权逃避法律责任?研究总统职位的政治学家往往忽视了我们这里所说的犯罪总统的风险。唐纳德-特朗普(Donald Trump)的总统任期凸显了这一风险,并开始将该领域的重点不仅转向总统权力,还转向总统约束。我们认为这种转变应该继续下去。在这篇评论中,我们旨在设定一个议程,使犯罪总统的危险成为更广泛理解总统职位的核心。我们将犯罪总统制置于有关总统权力的法律和宪法约束的更广泛问题中,强调不受法律约束的总统可能对民主构成的独特风险。我们呼吁更多地关注有关行政部门的法律规则--特别是单一行政思想--以及追究犯罪总统责任所需的政策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The US Presidency: Power and Constraint
How much should we fear that a president will break the law to pursue power—then use their office to avoid legal accountability? Political scientists studying the presidency have often overlooked the risk of what we here call a criminal president. Donald Trump's presidency spotlighted that risk and has begun to shift the field's focus toward not just presidential power but presidential constraints. We believe this shift should continue. In this review, we aim to set an agenda that makes the danger of a criminal president central to understanding the presidency more broadly. Situating the criminal presidency within wider questions about legal and constitutional constraints on presidential power, we emphasize the unique risks to democracy that a president unbound by law can pose. We call for a greater focus on the legal rules governing the executive branch—especially unitary executive ideas—and the policies needed to hold criminal presidents accountable.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
15.20
自引率
4.60%
发文量
23
期刊介绍: The Annual Review of Political Science has been published since 1998 to provide comprehensive coverage of critical advancements in the field. It encompasses a wide range of subjects within Political Science, such as political theory and philosophy, international relations, political economy, political behavior, American and comparative politics, public administration and policy, and methodology.
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