限制非法放贷的政策干预效果

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2024-06-15 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103894

Kaiwen Leong , Huailu Li , Nicola Pavanini , Christoph Walsh

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们通过对 1090 名从高利贷公司获得 11032 笔贷款的借款人进行独特的面板调查，估算出非法放贷市场的借贷结构模型。我们利用该模型评估了旨在限制该市场的干预措施的效果。我们发现，在样本期内发生的执法打击行动增加了放贷人的单位骚扰成本和利率，同时降低了贷款量、放贷人利润和借款人福利。剔除处于还款能力分布中间的借款人、减少赌博或减少时间折扣的政策也能有效降低贷款人的利润率。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The effects of policy interventions to limit illegal money lending

We estimate a structural model of borrowing and lending in the illegal money lending market using a unique panel survey of 1,090 borrowers taking out 11,032 loans from loan sharks. We use the model to evaluate the effects of interventions aimed at limiting this market. We find that an enforcement crackdown that occurred during our sample period increased lenders’ unit cost of harassment and interest rates, while lowering volume of loans, lender profits and borrower welfare. Policies removing borrowers in the middle of the repayment ability distribution, reducing gambling or reducing time discounting are also effective at lowering lender profitability.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.