Eric T. Rapley , Pradeep Sapkota , James Stekelberg
{"title":"公开披露税务筹划投资是否会引起税务机关的监督?","authors":"Eric T. Rapley , Pradeep Sapkota , James Stekelberg","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107224","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Given the returns to investments in tax planning documented by prior studies, we predict that disclosures of investments in tax planning required by the SEC could inform tax authorities about the benefits of examining particular firms. Consistent with this notion, we find that the amount of tax non-audit services fees a firm reports in the current year is significantly associated with multiple measures of tax authority monitoring over the subsequent years. This result is stronger among firms with greater bargaining power who may be able to demand more aggressive tax planning advice from their auditors. Additionally, we find that our results are concentrated within non-audit fees related to tax planning, rather than tax compliance. Our findings contribute to research on tax enforcement and auditor-provided tax services, and have practical implications for firms considering purchasing tax services from their auditors and corporate stakeholders assessing firms’ potential exposure to tax enforcement. Further, our study has public policy implications by providing evidence of an unintended consequence of SEC disclosure requirements.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":"46 ","pages":"Article 107224"},"PeriodicalIF":3.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do public disclosures of investments in tax planning attract monitoring by tax authorities?\",\"authors\":\"Eric T. Rapley , Pradeep Sapkota , James Stekelberg\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2024.107224\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Given the returns to investments in tax planning documented by prior studies, we predict that disclosures of investments in tax planning required by the SEC could inform tax authorities about the benefits of examining particular firms. Consistent with this notion, we find that the amount of tax non-audit services fees a firm reports in the current year is significantly associated with multiple measures of tax authority monitoring over the subsequent years. This result is stronger among firms with greater bargaining power who may be able to demand more aggressive tax planning advice from their auditors. Additionally, we find that our results are concentrated within non-audit fees related to tax planning, rather than tax compliance. Our findings contribute to research on tax enforcement and auditor-provided tax services, and have practical implications for firms considering purchasing tax services from their auditors and corporate stakeholders assessing firms’ potential exposure to tax enforcement. Further, our study has public policy implications by providing evidence of an unintended consequence of SEC disclosure requirements.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48070,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy\",\"volume\":\"46 \",\"pages\":\"Article 107224\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-06-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425424000474\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425424000474","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Do public disclosures of investments in tax planning attract monitoring by tax authorities?
Given the returns to investments in tax planning documented by prior studies, we predict that disclosures of investments in tax planning required by the SEC could inform tax authorities about the benefits of examining particular firms. Consistent with this notion, we find that the amount of tax non-audit services fees a firm reports in the current year is significantly associated with multiple measures of tax authority monitoring over the subsequent years. This result is stronger among firms with greater bargaining power who may be able to demand more aggressive tax planning advice from their auditors. Additionally, we find that our results are concentrated within non-audit fees related to tax planning, rather than tax compliance. Our findings contribute to research on tax enforcement and auditor-provided tax services, and have practical implications for firms considering purchasing tax services from their auditors and corporate stakeholders assessing firms’ potential exposure to tax enforcement. Further, our study has public policy implications by providing evidence of an unintended consequence of SEC disclosure requirements.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.