{"title":"有利己个体的社会网络的差异博弈策略","authors":"Hossein B. Jond","doi":"10.1109/TCSS.2024.3350736","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A social network population engages in collective actions as a direct result of forming a particular opinion. The strategic interactions among the individuals acting independently and selfishly naturally portray a noncooperative game. Nash equilibrium allows for self-enforcing strategic interactions between selfish and self-interested individuals. This article presents a differential game approach to the opinion formation problem in social networks to investigate the evolution of opinions as a result of a Nash equilibrium. The opinion of each individual is described by a differential equation, which is the continuous-time Hegselmann–Krause model for opinion dynamics with a time delay in input. The objective of each individual is to seek optimal strategies for its own opinion evolution by minimizing an individual cost function. Two differential game problems emerge, one for a population that is not stubborn and another for a population that is stubborn. The open-loop Nash equilibrium actions and their associated opinion trajectories are derived for both differential games using Pontryagin's principle. Additionally, the receding horizon control scheme is used to practice feedback strategies where the information flow is restricted by fixed and complete social graphs, as well as the second neighborhood concept. The game strategies were executed on the well-known Zachary's Karate Club social network and a representative family opinion network. The resulting opinion trajectories associated with the game strategies showed consensus, polarization, and disagreement in final opinions.","PeriodicalId":13044,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Differential Game Strategies for Social Networks With Self-Interested Individuals\",\"authors\":\"Hossein B. Jond\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/TCSS.2024.3350736\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A social network population engages in collective actions as a direct result of forming a particular opinion. The strategic interactions among the individuals acting independently and selfishly naturally portray a noncooperative game. Nash equilibrium allows for self-enforcing strategic interactions between selfish and self-interested individuals. This article presents a differential game approach to the opinion formation problem in social networks to investigate the evolution of opinions as a result of a Nash equilibrium. The opinion of each individual is described by a differential equation, which is the continuous-time Hegselmann–Krause model for opinion dynamics with a time delay in input. The objective of each individual is to seek optimal strategies for its own opinion evolution by minimizing an individual cost function. Two differential game problems emerge, one for a population that is not stubborn and another for a population that is stubborn. The open-loop Nash equilibrium actions and their associated opinion trajectories are derived for both differential games using Pontryagin's principle. Additionally, the receding horizon control scheme is used to practice feedback strategies where the information flow is restricted by fixed and complete social graphs, as well as the second neighborhood concept. The game strategies were executed on the well-known Zachary's Karate Club social network and a representative family opinion network. The resulting opinion trajectories associated with the game strategies showed consensus, polarization, and disagreement in final opinions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":13044,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10410428/\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, CYBERNETICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10410428/","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, CYBERNETICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Differential Game Strategies for Social Networks With Self-Interested Individuals
A social network population engages in collective actions as a direct result of forming a particular opinion. The strategic interactions among the individuals acting independently and selfishly naturally portray a noncooperative game. Nash equilibrium allows for self-enforcing strategic interactions between selfish and self-interested individuals. This article presents a differential game approach to the opinion formation problem in social networks to investigate the evolution of opinions as a result of a Nash equilibrium. The opinion of each individual is described by a differential equation, which is the continuous-time Hegselmann–Krause model for opinion dynamics with a time delay in input. The objective of each individual is to seek optimal strategies for its own opinion evolution by minimizing an individual cost function. Two differential game problems emerge, one for a population that is not stubborn and another for a population that is stubborn. The open-loop Nash equilibrium actions and their associated opinion trajectories are derived for both differential games using Pontryagin's principle. Additionally, the receding horizon control scheme is used to practice feedback strategies where the information flow is restricted by fixed and complete social graphs, as well as the second neighborhood concept. The game strategies were executed on the well-known Zachary's Karate Club social network and a representative family opinion network. The resulting opinion trajectories associated with the game strategies showed consensus, polarization, and disagreement in final opinions.
期刊介绍:
IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems focuses on such topics as modeling, simulation, analysis and understanding of social systems from the quantitative and/or computational perspective. "Systems" include man-man, man-machine and machine-machine organizations and adversarial situations as well as social media structures and their dynamics. More specifically, the proposed transactions publishes articles on modeling the dynamics of social systems, methodologies for incorporating and representing socio-cultural and behavioral aspects in computational modeling, analysis of social system behavior and structure, and paradigms for social systems modeling and simulation. The journal also features articles on social network dynamics, social intelligence and cognition, social systems design and architectures, socio-cultural modeling and representation, and computational behavior modeling, and their applications.