Abdullah Aljuffri, Ruoyu Huang, Laura Muntenaar, Georgi Gaydadjiev, Kezheng Ma, Said Hamdioui, M. Taouil
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引用次数: 0
摘要
高级加密标准(AES)是公认的用于保护数据完整性和机密性的强大加密算法。关于该算法的轻量级实现,文献主要强调面积和功耗优化,往往忽略了与性能和安全性相关的考虑因素。本文使用剖析和非剖析攻击评估了我们之前提出的两种轻量级 AES 实现。一种是未受保护的实现,另一种是使用面向域掩码(DOM)的受保护版本。研究结果表明,在设计中加入 DOM 可以提高抗攻击能力,但面积却增加了一倍。
The Security Evaluation of an Efficient Lightweight AES Accelerator
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is widely recognized as a robust cryptographic algorithm utilized to protect data integrity and confidentiality. When it comes to lightweight implementations of the algorithm, the literature mainly emphasizes area and power optimization, often overlooking considerations related to performance and security. This paper evaluates two of our previously proposed lightweight AES implementations using both profiled and non-profiled attacks. One is an unprotected implementation, and the other one is a protected version using Domain-Oriented Masking (DOM). The findings of this study indicate that the inclusion of DOM in the design enhances its resistance to attacks at the cost of doubling the area.