独裁者游戏中的建议与行为:实验研究

IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Simin He, Xintong Pan
{"title":"独裁者游戏中的建议与行为:实验研究","authors":"Simin He,&nbsp;Xintong Pan","doi":"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102243","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We experimentally examine the effects of advice on decision making in a dictator game in which participants receive no advice, selfish advice, or fair advice before making decisions and the advisors do not benefit from the decision makers’ actions. We find that participants receiving fair advice are more inclined to exhibit fair behavior, whereas those receiving selfish advice are more likely to act selfishly; however, no significant difference in magnitude between the effects of fair and selfish advice is found. We also discover that both types of advice have a more pronounced impact on participants with relatively lower social tendencies, as indicated by the social value orientation test. This study is the first to directly demonstrate the impact of fair and selfish advice in moral dilemmas.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51637,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Advice and behavior in a dictator game: An experimental study\",\"authors\":\"Simin He,&nbsp;Xintong Pan\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.socec.2024.102243\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We experimentally examine the effects of advice on decision making in a dictator game in which participants receive no advice, selfish advice, or fair advice before making decisions and the advisors do not benefit from the decision makers’ actions. We find that participants receiving fair advice are more inclined to exhibit fair behavior, whereas those receiving selfish advice are more likely to act selfishly; however, no significant difference in magnitude between the effects of fair and selfish advice is found. We also discover that both types of advice have a more pronounced impact on participants with relatively lower social tendencies, as indicated by the social value orientation test. This study is the first to directly demonstrate the impact of fair and selfish advice in moral dilemmas.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51637,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324000818\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804324000818","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

我们通过实验研究了独裁者游戏中建议对决策的影响,在该游戏中,参与者在做出决策前不会收到任何建议、自私建议或公平建议,且顾问不会从决策者的行为中获益。我们发现,接受公平建议的参与者更倾向于表现出公平的行为,而接受自私建议的参与者则更有可能采取自私的行为;但是,我们并没有发现公平建议和自私建议的影响程度有显著差异。我们还发现,这两种建议对社会价值取向测试显示的社会倾向相对较低的参与者的影响更为明显。本研究首次直接证明了公平和自私建议在道德困境中的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Advice and behavior in a dictator game: An experimental study

We experimentally examine the effects of advice on decision making in a dictator game in which participants receive no advice, selfish advice, or fair advice before making decisions and the advisors do not benefit from the decision makers’ actions. We find that participants receiving fair advice are more inclined to exhibit fair behavior, whereas those receiving selfish advice are more likely to act selfishly; however, no significant difference in magnitude between the effects of fair and selfish advice is found. We also discover that both types of advice have a more pronounced impact on participants with relatively lower social tendencies, as indicated by the social value orientation test. This study is the first to directly demonstrate the impact of fair and selfish advice in moral dilemmas.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
12.50%
发文量
113
审稿时长
83 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly the Journal of Socio-Economics) welcomes submissions that deal with various economic topics but also involve issues that are related to other social sciences, especially psychology, or use experimental methods of inquiry. Thus, contributions in behavioral economics, experimental economics, economic psychology, and judgment and decision making are especially welcome. The journal is open to different research methodologies, as long as they are relevant to the topic and employed rigorously. Possible methodologies include, for example, experiments, surveys, empirical work, theoretical models, meta-analyses, case studies, and simulation-based analyses. Literature reviews that integrate findings from many studies are also welcome, but they should synthesize the literature in a useful manner and provide substantial contribution beyond what the reader could get by simply reading the abstracts of the cited papers. In empirical work, it is important that the results are not only statistically significant but also economically significant. A high contribution-to-length ratio is expected from published articles and therefore papers should not be unnecessarily long, and short articles are welcome. Articles should be written in a manner that is intelligible to our generalist readership. Book reviews are generally solicited but occasionally unsolicited reviews will also be published. Contact the Book Review Editor for related inquiries.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信