给我看钱企业有形奖励的供需错位*

IF 1.6 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Kyle M. Stubbs, Jeremiah W. Bentley
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在激励合同中,主管通常会设定员工的绩效目标,而员工则决定自己愿意付出多大的努力来达到目标并获得激励。主管和员工都会根据所需或所付出的努力来判断激励措施的价值。最近关于激励类型的研究调查了员工对有形奖励和现金奖励所付出的努力,前提是员工对这两种奖励的重视程度可能不同。我们通过调查主管和员工是否会针对有形奖励和现金奖励做出不同的与努力相关的决策,对这一研究进行了扩展。具体来说,根据构解层面的理论,我们预测主管会比员工更青睐有形奖励而非现金奖励。我们进行了一项实验室实验,要求参与者扮演主管或员工的角色。我们操纵奖励类型(有形奖励或现金奖励),并测量主管为获得奖励需要付出多少工作,员工为获得奖励愿意付出多少工作。正如我们所预测的那样,我们发现相对于现金奖励,有形奖励对主管目标设定的提高明显高于对员工努力程度的提高。我们的研究结果为现实世界的激励薪酬设计提供了启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Show Me the Money! Supply and Demand Misalignment for Tangible Rewards in Business*

In incentive contracts, supervisors often set targets for employee performance, while employees decide the effort they are willing to exert to meet the target and earn the incentive. Both supervisors and employees make judgments about the value of incentives in terms of effort required or expended. Recent research on incentive types investigates employee effort in response to tangible and cash rewards under the premise that they may be valued differently by employees. We extend this research by investigating whether supervisors and employees make different effort-related decisions in response to tangible and cash rewards. Specifically, relying on construal-level theory, we predict that supervisors will favor tangible rewards relative to cash more than employees will. We conduct a lab experiment where we ask participants to take the role of either supervisor or employee. We manipulate the reward type (tangible or cash) and measure how much work supervisors demand and employees are willing to provide to obtain the reward. As predicted, we find that the tangible rewards, relative to cash, increase supervisors' target setting significantly more than employee effort levels. Our results offer implications for real-world incentive compensation design.

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来源期刊
Accounting Perspectives
Accounting Perspectives BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: Accounting Perspectives provides a forum for peer-reviewed applied research, analysis, synthesis and commentary on issues of interest to academics, practitioners, financial analysts, financial executives, regulators, accounting policy makers and accounting students. Articles are sought from academics and practitioners that address relevant issues in any and all areas of accounting and related fields, including financial accounting and reporting, auditing and other assurance services, management accounting and performance measurement, information systems and related technologies, tax policy and practice, professional ethics, accounting education, and related topics. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing.
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