{"title":"股权控制、所有权集中度和巴西企业的价值","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.bir.2024.05.008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The study analyzes whether the type of shareholding control (dispersed, shared, or dominant) affects agency conflicts by investigating the relationship between shareholding control, ownership concentration, and firm value. The sample is a panel data comprising 1977 firm-year observations from 167 Brazilian firms in the period 2010–2022. Our results show that shared control creates value, whereas dominant control destroys firm value. Voting rights concentration and cash-flow rights reduce the value of firms with dispersed and shared control. However, at firms with dominant control, these firm characteristics increase firm value. Excess voting rights, in turn, destroy the value of firms with shared and dominant control. Our evidence shows that the type of shareholding control influences the nature and magnitude of agency conflicts and the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. Thus, within an institutional environment, agency conflicts may differ among firms, depending on the type of shareholding control.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46690,"journal":{"name":"Borsa Istanbul Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845024000875/pdfft?md5=fdfa23fbf1bd390b92262252c3ac2967&pid=1-s2.0-S2214845024000875-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Shareholding control, ownership concentration, and the value of the Brazilian firm\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.bir.2024.05.008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>The study analyzes whether the type of shareholding control (dispersed, shared, or dominant) affects agency conflicts by investigating the relationship between shareholding control, ownership concentration, and firm value. The sample is a panel data comprising 1977 firm-year observations from 167 Brazilian firms in the period 2010–2022. Our results show that shared control creates value, whereas dominant control destroys firm value. Voting rights concentration and cash-flow rights reduce the value of firms with dispersed and shared control. However, at firms with dominant control, these firm characteristics increase firm value. Excess voting rights, in turn, destroy the value of firms with shared and dominant control. Our evidence shows that the type of shareholding control influences the nature and magnitude of agency conflicts and the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. Thus, within an institutional environment, agency conflicts may differ among firms, depending on the type of shareholding control.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46690,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Borsa Istanbul Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845024000875/pdfft?md5=fdfa23fbf1bd390b92262252c3ac2967&pid=1-s2.0-S2214845024000875-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Borsa Istanbul Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845024000875\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Borsa Istanbul Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845024000875","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Shareholding control, ownership concentration, and the value of the Brazilian firm
The study analyzes whether the type of shareholding control (dispersed, shared, or dominant) affects agency conflicts by investigating the relationship between shareholding control, ownership concentration, and firm value. The sample is a panel data comprising 1977 firm-year observations from 167 Brazilian firms in the period 2010–2022. Our results show that shared control creates value, whereas dominant control destroys firm value. Voting rights concentration and cash-flow rights reduce the value of firms with dispersed and shared control. However, at firms with dominant control, these firm characteristics increase firm value. Excess voting rights, in turn, destroy the value of firms with shared and dominant control. Our evidence shows that the type of shareholding control influences the nature and magnitude of agency conflicts and the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. Thus, within an institutional environment, agency conflicts may differ among firms, depending on the type of shareholding control.
期刊介绍:
Peer Review under the responsibility of Borsa İstanbul Anonim Sirketi. Borsa İstanbul Review provides a scholarly platform for empirical financial studies including but not limited to financial markets and institutions, financial economics, investor behavior, financial centers and market structures, corporate finance, recent economic and financial trends. Micro and macro data applications and comparative studies are welcome. Country coverage includes advanced, emerging and developing economies. In particular, we would like to publish empirical papers with significant policy implications and encourage submissions in the following areas: Research Topics: • Investments and Portfolio Management • Behavioral Finance • Financial Markets and Institutions • Market Microstructure • Islamic Finance • Financial Risk Management • Valuation • Capital Markets Governance • Financial Regulations