股权控制、所有权集中度和巴西企业的价值

IF 6.3 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究通过调查股权控制、所有权集中度和公司价值之间的关系,分析股权控制类型(分散、共享或主导)是否会影响代理冲突。样本是由 2010-2022 年间 167 家巴西公司的 1977 个公司年观测数据组成的面板数据。我们的研究结果表明,共同控制创造价值,而主导控制破坏公司价值。表决权集中和现金流权降低了拥有分散和共享控制权的公司的价值。然而,在拥有主导控制权的公司,这些公司特征会增加公司价值。反过来,过多的投票权又会破坏共享控制权和主导控制权企业的价值。我们的证据表明,股权控制类型会影响代理冲突的性质和规模,以及所有权集中度与公司价值之间的关系。因此,在制度环境中,不同公司的代理冲突可能会因股权控制类型的不同而不同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Shareholding control, ownership concentration, and the value of the Brazilian firm

The study analyzes whether the type of shareholding control (dispersed, shared, or dominant) affects agency conflicts by investigating the relationship between shareholding control, ownership concentration, and firm value. The sample is a panel data comprising 1977 firm-year observations from 167 Brazilian firms in the period 2010–2022. Our results show that shared control creates value, whereas dominant control destroys firm value. Voting rights concentration and cash-flow rights reduce the value of firms with dispersed and shared control. However, at firms with dominant control, these firm characteristics increase firm value. Excess voting rights, in turn, destroy the value of firms with shared and dominant control. Our evidence shows that the type of shareholding control influences the nature and magnitude of agency conflicts and the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. Thus, within an institutional environment, agency conflicts may differ among firms, depending on the type of shareholding control.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.60
自引率
3.80%
发文量
130
审稿时长
26 days
期刊介绍: Peer Review under the responsibility of Borsa İstanbul Anonim Sirketi. Borsa İstanbul Review provides a scholarly platform for empirical financial studies including but not limited to financial markets and institutions, financial economics, investor behavior, financial centers and market structures, corporate finance, recent economic and financial trends. Micro and macro data applications and comparative studies are welcome. Country coverage includes advanced, emerging and developing economies. In particular, we would like to publish empirical papers with significant policy implications and encourage submissions in the following areas: Research Topics: • Investments and Portfolio Management • Behavioral Finance • Financial Markets and Institutions • Market Microstructure • Islamic Finance • Financial Risk Management • Valuation • Capital Markets Governance • Financial Regulations
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