快递:内生生产时间的竞争者之间的信息共享

IF 4.8 3区 管理学 Q1 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING
Tian Li, Huajiang Luo, Weixin Shang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了两家相互竞争的公司分享需求信息的动机及其生产时间策略。其中一家公司采用常规时间安排,即其生产时间根据先前产品型号的生产时间固定不变。另一家企业则采用策略性时间安排,即其生产时间可以策略性地选择在常规时间安排企业的生产时间之前、同时或之后。企业决定是否公开自己的私人需求信息,并根据现有的需求信息同时或先后做出数量决策。我们分析了战略企业在不同信息共享情况下的最优生产时机决策,发现先发制人通常不是最优选择。我们证明了内生的生产时机可以为信息共享提供激励,并描述了两家公司共享信息、一家公司共享信息或两家公司都不共享信息的条件。此外,我们还揭示了内生生产时间条件下信息共享的几种有趣含义:在竞争加剧的情况下,企业更有可能共享信息;企业可能会从对手的卓越信息能力中获益;信息共享的选择会提高社会福利,而社会福利也可能从更激烈的竞争中获益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
EXPRESS: Information Sharing between Competitors with Endogenous Production Timing
We study two competing firms’ incentives for demand information sharing and their production timing strategies. One firm adopts routine timing, where her production time is fixed according to her previous product models’ manufacturing time. The other firm uses strategic timing, where his production time can be strategically chosen to occur before, concurrently with, or after that of the routine-timing firm. The firms decide whether to disclose their private demand information and make quantity decisions based on the available demand information, either simultaneously or sequentially. We analyze the optimal production timing decisions for the strategic firm under different information sharing scenarios and find that a preemptive move is generally not optimal. We demonstrate that endogenous production timing can create incentives for information sharing and characterize the conditions under which both firms share information, one firm shares information, or neither firm shares information. Additionally, we uncover several interesting implications of information sharing under endogenous production timing: firms are more likely to share information in intensified competition, a firm may benefit from its rival’s superior information capability, and the option of information sharing enhances social welfare, which may also benefit from more intense competition.
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来源期刊
Production and Operations Management
Production and Operations Management 管理科学-工程:制造
CiteScore
7.50
自引率
16.00%
发文量
278
审稿时长
24 months
期刊介绍: The mission of Production and Operations Management is to serve as the flagship research journal in operations management in manufacturing and services. The journal publishes scientific research into the problems, interest, and concerns of managers who manage product and process design, operations, and supply chains. It covers all topics in product and process design, operations, and supply chain management and welcomes papers using any research paradigm.
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