在有风险规避型卖家的平台双渠道供应链中采用区块链的策略

IF 3.1 4区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT
Huimin Zhang, Zhenkai Lou, Fujun Hou, Yan Yan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了在平台双渠道供应链中采用区块链技术(BT)的策略,即供应商在电子零售商现有转售渠道(RC)之外建立一个直销渠道(DC)。供应商和电子零售商都是风险规避者,他们通过一个共同的在线平台接触消费者。网络平台拥有引入 BT 的能力,可以选择在两个渠道中都不引入 BT,也可以选择在一个渠道(DC 或 RC)或两个渠道都引入 BT。我们建立了四种策略的博弈模型,并通过逆向归纳法得到了相应的均衡结果。我们的分析表明,当竞争强度高、感知风险规避水平和 BT 单位成本都较低时,在线平台只倾向于在 DC 采用 BT。否则,在线平台会同时偏好采用 BT 和 DC 两种渠道。在采用 BT 战略方面,供应商与网络平台的偏好相同。有趣的是,只有当 BT 的单位成本较高时,网络零售商才会在采用 BT 的同时只选择 DC;否则,她会在采用 BT 的同时只选择 RC。此外,我们还通过修改参数配置和序列博弈增强了基本模型,并验证了我们在这些扩展中的主要发现仍然稳健。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Blockchain adoption strategy in a platform dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse sellers

This paper investigates blockchain technology (BT) adoption strategy in a platform dual-channel supply chain, wherein the supplier establishes a direct selling channel (DC) in addition to the existing reselling channel (RC) of the e-retailer. Both the supplier and the e-retailer are risk-averse, and they have access to consumers through a common online platform. The online platform possesses the capability to introduce BT and can opt to introduce it to neither, one (DC or RC) or both channels. Game models for the four strategies are developed, and the corresponding equilibrium outcomes are obtained using backward induction. Our analysis reveals that when competition intensity is high and both perceived risk aversion level and BT's unit cost are low, the online platform prefers only DC with adopting BT. Otherwise, it prefers both channels with adopting BT. The supplier shares the same preference as the online platform for BT adoption strategy. Interestingly, the e-retailer prefers only DC with adopting BT only when BT's unit cost is high; otherwise, she prefers solely RC with adopting BT. Furthermore, we enhance the basic model by modifying parameter configurations and the sequence game, and verify that our main findings in these extensions remain robust.

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来源期刊
International Transactions in Operational Research
International Transactions in Operational Research OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE-
CiteScore
7.80
自引率
12.90%
发文量
146
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: International Transactions in Operational Research (ITOR) aims to advance the understanding and practice of Operational Research (OR) and Management Science internationally. Its scope includes: International problems, such as those of fisheries management, environmental issues, and global competitiveness International work done by major OR figures Studies of worldwide interest from nations with emerging OR communities National or regional OR work which has the potential for application in other nations Technical developments of international interest Specific organizational examples that can be applied in other countries National and international presentations of transnational interest Broadly relevant professional issues, such as those of ethics and practice Applications relevant to global industries, such as operations management, manufacturing, and logistics.
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