司法制度设计与公司诉讼:来自中国自然实验的证据

IF 1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Shengfeng Lu, Hui Tian, Yan Zhao, Yukun Sun
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引用次数: 0

摘要

一个国家的司法机构会对企业诉讼产生影响。2003 年至 2010 年,中国允许政法委书记兼任各省公安厅厅长。这一政策为司法环境的变化提供了一个天然的实验。在本文中,我们采用交错差分法(Staggered Difference-in-Differences method),利用 1998 年至 2010 年的上市公司数据,研究了司法体制变化对企业诉讼的影响。我们发现,在中国实行资本充足率政策的时期(即司法公正可能较弱的时期),企业参与公司诉讼的数量较少。进一步的分析表明,非国有企业的胜诉概率增加。机制分析表明,中非共和国政策通过改变企业对司法系统中政治和法律机构地位的看法,增加了经济政策的不确定性,从而减少了企业的司法参与。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Judicial institutional design and corporate litigation: Evidence from a natural experiment in China

The judicial institutions of a country impact corporate litigation. From 2003 to 2010, China allowed the appointed secretaries of the Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs to hold concurrent administrative roles (CAR) as directors of the Police Departments in their respective provinces. Such a policy provides a natural experiment on the change of the judicial environment. In this paper, we employ a Staggered Difference-in-Differences method to study the effect of changes in judicial institution on corporate litigation using data on publicly traded corporations from 1998 to 2010. We find corporations engage in fewer corporate litigations during the time period of China's CAR policy (i.e., when judicial justice was likely weaker). Further analysis shows that the probability of winning lawsuits increases for non-state-owned enterprises. Mechanism analysis shows that the CAR policy heightens the uncertainty of economic policies by changing companies' perceptions of the status of political and legal institutions in the judicial system, thereby reducing corporate judicial participation.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
11.10%
发文量
32
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