设计审讯

IF 5.9 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2024-05-24 DOI:10.1093/restud/rdae002

Alessandro Ispano, Péter Vida

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提供了一个双面信息不对称的审讯模型。嫌疑人知道自己是有罪还是无罪，也知道执法者的证据可能有多有力。我们比较了一次审讯均衡中的起诉错误和完全承诺下的最优机制中的起诉错误。我们描述了一种披露证据的来回审讯，它在没有任何承诺的情况下实现了均衡中的最优。

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Designing Interrogations

We provide a model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of the law enforcer’s evidence, which is informative about the suspect’s status and may also disprove lies. We compare prosecution errors in the equilibrium of the one-shot interrogation and in the optimal mechanism under full commitment. We describe a back-and-forth interrogation with disclosure of the evidence that implements the optimum in equilibrium without any commitment.

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来源期刊

Review of Economic Studies ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

10.40

自引率

3.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： Founded in 1933 by a group of young British and American economists, The Review of Economic Studies aims to encourage research in theoretical and applied economics, especially by young economists. Today it is widely recognised as one of the core top-five economics journals. The Review is essential reading for economists and has a reputation for publishing path-breaking papers in theoretical and applied economics. The Review is committed to continuing to publish strong papers in all areas of economics. The Editors aim to provide an efficient and high-quality review process to the Review''s authors. Where articles are sent out for full review, authors receive careful reports and feedback. Since 1989 The Review has held annual May Meetings to offer young students in economics and finance the chance to present their research to audiences in Europe.