故意忽视不平等,以避免拒绝不公平的提议

Konstantin Offer, Dorothee Mischkowski, Zoe Rahwan, Christoph Engel
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如果惩罚者和被惩罚者都要付出代价,而惩罚者却得不到任何直接的物质利益,那么人们为什么还要惩罚不公平现象呢?经济学的公平理论认为,惩罚者会从不利的不平等中获得不利益,并通过惩罚来实现结果的平等。我们在一个修改过的最后通牒游戏(N = 1370)中检验了这些理论,研究了人们是否会通过故意使自己对不公平视而不见来避免拒绝不公平提议的冲动,从而惩罚提议者。我们发现,53% 的参与者故意忽略他们是否收到了不公平的提议。在这些参与者中,只有 6% 的提议被拒绝。不出所料,主动寻求信息的参与者拒绝了更多的不公平提议(39%)。将这些拒绝率平均为 21%,发现与我们的假设相反,被直接告知不公平的参与者的拒绝率没有显著差异。我们将这些发现解释为分类行为的证据:受到惩罚的人在经历不公平后会寻求相关信息,而没有受到惩罚的人则会故意忽略不公平。本注册报告的第一阶段方案于 2023 年 10 月 13 日原则上被接受。期刊接受的协议可在 https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.24559132.v1 上找到。在最后通牒游戏中,故意选择不知道自己是否收到不公平报价的参与者比主动选择知道的参与者更有可能接受不公平报价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Deliberately ignoring inequality to avoid rejecting unfair offers

Deliberately ignoring inequality to avoid rejecting unfair offers
Why do people punish experienced unfairness if it induces costs for both the punisher and punished person(s) without any direct material benefits for the punisher? Economic theories of fairness propose that punishers experience disutility from disadvantageous inequality and punish in order to establish equality in outcomes. We tested these theories in a modified Ultimatum Game (N = 1370) by examining whether people avoid the urge to reject unfair offers, and thereby punish the proposer, by deliberately blinding themselves to unfairness. We found that 53% of participants deliberately ignored whether they had received an unfair offer. Among these participants, only 6% of offers were rejected. As expected, participants who actively sought information rejected significantly more unfair offers (39%). Averaging these rejection rates to 21%, no significant difference to the rejection rate by participants who were directly informed about unfairness was found, contrary to our hypothesis. We interpret these findings as evidence for sorting behavior: People who punish experienced unfairness seek information about it, while those who do not punish deliberately ignore it. The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 13 October 2023. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.24559132.v1 . Players in the ultimatum game who deliberately choose to be ignorant about whether they received an unfair offer are more likely to accept unfair offers than participants who actively choose to know.
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