体育运动员的转会市场--一种竞赛理论方法

Yizhaq Minchuk
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文采用竞争理论方法分析了体育运动员的转会市场。运动队为吸引球员会付出两种努力:一种是生产性努力,只有当球员与运动队签订合同时,运动队才会为此付出代价;另一种是说服性努力,无论如何,运动队都会为此付出代价。研究结果描述了没有劝说努力的条件,以及劝说努力对生产性努力和选手效用的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The transfer market for sports players - A contest theory approach

The transfer market for sports players is analyzed using a contest theory approach. A sports team exerts two types of effort in order to attract a player: productive effort, for which the team incurs a cost only if the player signs a contract with them; and persuading effort, for which the team incurs a cost regardless. The findings describe the conditions under which there will be no persuading effort, as well as the impact of persuading effort on productive effort and the contestant's utility.

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