信号相关性下的信念形成

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Tanjim Hossain , Ryo Okui
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文论证了在描述人们的信念形成规则时,考虑人们对方差的不正确认识的重要性,当他们受到相关性忽视时。通过实验室实验,我们激发了受试者对随机变量实现的后验信念,其中受试者接收到的一些信号是相关的。在我们的实验中,受试者在更新他们的信念时始终会忽略相关性,而且还会误解信号方差。我们提出了行为模型,说明相对于贝叶斯预测,存在这两种偏差的人是如何高估强相关信号和低估弱相关信号的。额外的实验为相关性忽视对信念更新规则的细微影响提供了有力支持。估计的模型参数与受试者表现出的高水平相关性忽视和对真实方差增加的低敏感性是一致的。此外,我们还发现受试者之间存在明显的异质性,大多数受试者都表现出了相关忽视和方差误知。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Belief formation under signal correlation

This paper demonstrates the importance of considering incorrect perceptions of variance in characterizing people's belief formation rules when they suffer from correlation neglect. Using laboratory experiments, we elicit posterior beliefs regarding the realization of a random variable where some signals that a subject receives are correlated. Subjects in our experiments consistently neglect correlation and also misperceive signal variance when updating their beliefs. We present behavioral models that illustrate how people who suffer from both biases overvalue strongly correlated signals and undervalue weakly correlated signals relative to Bayesian predictions. Additional experiments provide strong support for such a nuanced impact of correlation neglect on belief updating rules. The estimated model parameters are consistent with subjects showing high levels of correlation neglect and undersensitivity to increases in the true variance. Moreover, we find significant heterogeneity across subjects, with a majority exhibiting correlation neglect combined with variance misperception.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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