有转换成本的重复博弈中的民间定理

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-20 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.006

Yevgeny Tsodikovich , Xavier Venel , Anna Zseleva

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了转换成本如何影响重复博弈中的子博弈完全均衡。我们的研究表明：(i) 只要博弈者有足够的耐心，福克定理就成立；(ii) 只要考虑到简单的单次辅助博弈的收益，就能得到一组均衡收益；(iii) 在无限不贴现的重复博弈中，转换成本对博弈者有负面影响，但在有限重复博弈或贴现博弈中，转换成本可能对博弈者有利。

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Folk theorems in repeated games with switching costs

We study how switching costs affect the subgame perfect equilibria in repeated games. We show that (i) the Folk Theorem holds whenever the players are patient enough; (ii) the set of equilibrium payoffs is obtained by considering the payoffs of a simple one-shot auxiliary game; and (iii) the switching costs have a negative impact on a player in the infinitely undiscounted repeated game but can be beneficial for him in a finitely repeated game or in a discounted game.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology