背景很重要:外国投标人声誉在跨国收购竞争中的信号作用

IF 8.9 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Weiting Zheng , Yaqin Zheng , Jingtao Yi , Noman Shaheer , Sali Li
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引用次数: 0

摘要

现有研究对外国收购方如何提高其在跨国收购交易中的成功机会的理解有限。本文运用并扩展了信号传递理论,认为在收购交易的竞标阶段,竞标者和卖方之间的信息不对称加剧,外国竞标者的声誉可以作为一种质量信号,增加他们战胜国内竞标者的可能性。重要的是,这种信号只有在卖方国家存在强烈民族主义情绪时才有效。对 1994 年至 2016 年间 275 次跨境多竞标者收购竞赛中 580 个竞标者的分析支持了我们的预测。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Context matters: The signaling role of foreign bidders’ reputation in cross-border acquisition contests

Existing research offers limited understanding of how foreign acquirers enhance their chance of success in cross-border acquisition (CBA) deals. Engaging and extending signaling theory, this paper argues that during the bidding stage of an acquisition deal wherein information asymmetry is heightened between the bidder and seller, reputation of foreign bidders can serve as a signal of quality, increasing their likelihood of winning a deal over domestic bidders. Importantly, this signal is only effective when there is strong nationalist sentiment in the seller's country. Analyses of 580 bidders in 275 cross-border multi-bidder acquisition contests between 1994 and 2016 support our predictions.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
16.50
自引率
11.20%
发文量
73
期刊介绍: The Journal of World Business holds a distinguished position as a leading publication within the realm of International Business. Rooted in a legacy dating back to 1965, when it was established as the Columbia Journal of World Business, JWB is committed to disseminating cutting-edge research that reflects significant advancements in the field. The journal actively seeks submissions that propel new theoretical frameworks and innovative perspectives on International Business phenomena. Aligned with its domain statement, submissions are expected to possess a clear multinational, cross-border, or international comparative focus, while remaining pertinent to the study of management and organizations. JWB particularly encourages submissions that challenge established theories or assumptions, presenting pioneering or counterintuitive findings. With an inclusive approach, the journal welcomes contributions from diverse conceptual and theoretical traditions, encompassing allied social sciences and behavioral sciences. Submissions should either develop new theories or rigorously test existing ones, employing a variety of qualitative, quantitative, or other methodological approaches. While JWB primarily caters to scholars and researchers, it values contributions that explore implications for Multinational Enterprises and their management, as well as ramifications for public policy and the broader societal role of business.
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