知道自己知道自己知道?极端自信的启发式思维会导致对元认知表现进行高于机会的辨别。

IF 3.1 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL
Neuroscience of Consciousness Pub Date : 2024-05-22 eCollection Date: 2024-01-01 DOI:10.1093/nc/niae020
Maxine T Sherman, Anil K Seth
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在日常生活中,我们不仅可以估计自己对推论的信心("我肯定我没通过考试"),还可以估计这些信心是否能很好地预测决策的准确性("我觉得我肯定没通过,但我的感觉可能是错的;我可能通过了")。在实验室中,通过使用简单的感知任务和收集逐次试验的信心评级,视觉元认知研究已多次表明,参与者可以成功预测其感知选择的准确性。参与者是否也能在这些任务中成功评估 "自信中的自信"?这就是本研究要解决的问题。受试者进行了一项简单的两区间强迫选择数字任务,该任务以考试为框架。信心判断以 "预测考试成绩 "的形式收集。最后,我们通过两区间强迫选择设计收集 "元认知 "报告:试验成对出现,参与者必须选择他们认为信心(预测成绩)与准确率(实际成绩)最匹配的试验,从而有效地将二次计分规则(QSR)得分降到最低。在使用 2 型 ROC 下面积(AUROC2)量化元认知表现时,学员们成功地选择了元认知表现较好的试验,但在使用 "黄金标准 "指标 m-ratio 时,学员们却没有成功地选择元认知表现较差的试验。然而,进一步的分析表明,参与者选择 AUROC2 较低的试验部分是通过极端置信启发式,而不是通过对元认知推论的明确评估:当分析范围限制在参与者给出相同置信度的试验时,AUROC2 不再作为选择的函数而存在差异;同样,当我们排除给出极端置信度的试验时,AUROC2 也不再作为选择的函数而存在差异。总之,我们的研究结果表明,参与者能够对其视觉信心评级进行有效的元认知判别,但可能并不需要明确的 "元认知 "过程。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Knowing that you know that you know? An extreme-confidence heuristic can lead to above-chance discrimination of metacognitive performance.

In daily life, we can not only estimate confidence in our inferences ('I'm sure I failed that exam'), but can also estimate whether those feelings of confidence are good predictors of decision accuracy ('I feel sure I failed, but my feeling is probably wrong; I probably passed'). In the lab, by using simple perceptual tasks and collecting trial-by-trial confidence ratings visual metacognition research has repeatedly shown that participants can successfully predict the accuracy of their perceptual choices. Can participants also successfully evaluate 'confidence in confidence' in these tasks? This is the question addressed in this study. Participants performed a simple, two-interval forced choice numerosity task framed as an exam. Confidence judgements were collected in the form of a 'predicted exam grade'. Finally, we collected 'meta-metacognitive' reports in a two-interval forced-choice design: trials were presented in pairs, and participants had to select that in which they thought their confidence (predicted grade) best matched their accuracy (actual grade), effectively minimizing their quadratic scoring rule (QSR) score. Participants successfully selected trials on which their metacognition was better when metacognitive performance was quantified using area under the type 2 ROC (AUROC2) but not when using the 'gold-standard' measure m-ratio. However, further analyses suggested that participants selected trials on which AUROC2 is lower in part via an extreme-confidence heuristic, rather than through explicit evaluation of metacognitive inferences: when restricting analyses to trials on which participants gave the same confidence rating AUROC2 no longer differed as a function of selection, and likewise when we excluded trials on which extreme confidence ratings were given. Together, our results show that participants are able to make effective metacognitive discriminations on their visual confidence ratings, but that explicit 'meta-metacognitive' processes may not be required.

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来源期刊
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Neuroscience of Consciousness Psychology-Clinical Psychology
CiteScore
6.90
自引率
2.40%
发文量
16
审稿时长
19 weeks
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