利用临时协议整合雷法和纳什谈判方法

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-16 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.003

Kalyan Chatterjee , Rakesh Chaturvedi

{"title":"利用临时协议整合雷法和纳什谈判方法","authors":"Kalyan Chatterjee , Rakesh Chaturvedi","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Raiffa's solution to the bargaining problem, outlined in <span>Luce and Raiffa (1957)</span>, is the point where the <em>negotiation curve</em> - a sequence of points that constitute step-by-step improvements from the status quo in the feasible payoff space - meets (possibly in the limit) the efficient boundary of the feasible region. A bargaining model with interim agreements yields a negotiation curve in equilibrium (in the spirit of Raiffa), and as the bargaining frictions disappear, the Raiffa path of payoffs converges to the Nash solution.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"146 ","pages":"Pages 105-120"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements\",\"authors\":\"Kalyan Chatterjee , Rakesh Chaturvedi\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Raiffa's solution to the bargaining problem, outlined in <span>Luce and Raiffa (1957)</span>, is the point where the <em>negotiation curve</em> - a sequence of points that constitute step-by-step improvements from the status quo in the feasible payoff space - meets (possibly in the limit) the efficient boundary of the feasible region. A bargaining model with interim agreements yields a negotiation curve in equilibrium (in the spirit of Raiffa), and as the bargaining frictions disappear, the Raiffa path of payoffs converges to the Nash solution.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48291,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Games and Economic Behavior\",\"volume\":\"146 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 105-120\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Games and Economic Behavior\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982562400071X\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982562400071X","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

拉伊法在卢斯和拉伊法（1957）中概述了讨价还价问题的解决方案，即谈判曲线--在可行的报酬空间中构成从现状逐步改善的点序列--与可行区域的有效边界相交（可能在极限中）的点。具有临时协议的谈判模型在均衡状态下会产生一条谈判曲线（符合雷法的精神），随着谈判摩擦的消失，雷法的报酬路径会收敛到纳什解。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements

Raiffa's solution to the bargaining problem, outlined in Luce and Raiffa (1957), is the point where the negotiation curve - a sequence of points that constitute step-by-step improvements from the status quo in the feasible payoff space - meets (possibly in the limit) the efficient boundary of the feasible region. A bargaining model with interim agreements yields a negotiation curve in equilibrium (in the spirit of Raiffa), and as the bargaining frictions disappear, the Raiffa path of payoffs converges to the Nash solution.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology