揭示僵尸企业高不良贷款背后的驱动力:一项以高管为中心的研究

IF 1.8 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Min Bai, Dong Zhang, Wenzhuo Zhao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

目的 过度借贷在很大程度上会导致企业违约并向僵尸企业过渡。尽管政府努力实施去杠杆化政策,引导银行信贷流向,但有必要从微观层面深入研究引导僵尸企业借贷行为的内部动力。为了全面了解这一问题,本研究重点考察了促使僵尸企业高管持续向银行进行大规模借贷的诱因。我们利用 2007 年至 2020 年中国上市公司的相关数据,采用逐一识别的方法找出僵尸企业。研究结果表明,随着银行对僵尸企业贷款的增加,高管货币薪酬下降,而高管在职消费增加,高管被迫轮岗的可能性降低。机制检验表明,企业绩效部分地调解了银行贷款与高管货币薪酬之间的关系,但这种调解对在职消费和岗位轮换无效。进一步的研究表明,央企的产权性质和修改后的审计意见会加剧银行贷款对僵尸企业高管货币薪酬的不利影响,而不会显著影响在职消费和岗位轮换。反之,高管权力并不能增强银行贷款对货币补偿或在职消费的正面影响,但却能削弱银行贷款对僵尸企业高管强制轮岗的负面影响。研究局限/启示这些结果表明,虽然银行贷款可能会对企业价值产生负面影响,但却起到了保障高管职位和利益的作用。本研究具有理论意义,因为它探讨了高借款企业不良贷款背后的动机,揭示了僵尸企业在公司治理方面遇到的挑战,并为解决包括僵尸企业在内的高借款企业持续不良贷款的根本原因提供了政策启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Unveiling the driving forces behind high non-performing loans in zombie enterprises: an executive-centric study
PurposeExcessive borrowing significantly contributes to pushing businesses towards default and their transition into zombie enterprises. Despite government efforts to implement deleveraging policies and guide bank credit flows, it’s essential to delve into the internal dynamics that steer the borrowing behavior of these zombie enterprises at a micro level. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the issue, this study focuses on examining the incentives that drive corporate executives of zombie enterprises to consistently engage in large-scale borrowing from banks.Design/methodology/approachIn this study, panel data analysis is utilized, incorporating firm-, industry- and year-fixed effects. Drawing from data pertaining to listed companies in China spanning from 2007 to 2020, we employ a one-by-one identification method to pinpoint zombie enterprises. Ultimately, a total of 2,533 samples of zombie enterprises were obtained.FindingsThe results indicate that as bank loans to zombie enterprises increase, executive monetary compensation decreases, while on-the-job consumption by executives increases, and they are less likely to be forced into rotation. Mechanism testing reveals that corporate performance partially mediates the relationship between bank loans and executive monetary compensation, but this mediation is ineffective for on-the-job consumption and job rotation. Further investigation suggests that the property rights nature of central enterprises and modified audit opinions can exacerbate the adverse impact of bank loans on the monetary compensation of zombie corporate executives, without significantly affecting on-the-job consumption or job rotation. Conversely, executive power does not enhance the positive effects of bank loans on monetary compensation or on-the-job consumption, but it diminishes the negative impact of bank loans on the forced rotation of zombie executives.Research limitations/implicationsThese results indicate that while bank loans may have a negative impact on corporate value, they function as safeguards for the positions and interests of executives. As a result, bank loans serve as incentives for executives of zombie enterprises.Originality/valueThis study holds theoretical significance as it explores the motivations behind non-performing loans in high-borrowing enterprises, sheds light on corporate governance challenges encountered by zombie enterprises and provides policy insights aimed at addressing the underlying causes of persistent non-performing loans in high-borrowing enterprises, including zombie enterprises.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
47
期刊介绍: Treasury and Financial Risk Management ■Redefining, measuring and identifying new methods to manage risk for financing decisions ■The role, costs and benefits of insurance and hedging financing decisions ■The role of rating agencies in managerial decisions Investment and Financing Decision Making ■The uses and applications of forecasting to examine financing decisions measurement and comparisons of various financing options ■The public versus private financing decision ■The decision of where to be publicly traded - including comparisons of market structures and exchanges ■Short term versus long term portfolio management - choice of securities (debt vs equity, convertible vs non-convertible)
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