消费信贷合同中对债务人收入的操纵

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2024-05-10 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103851

Vyacheslav Mikhed , Sahil Raina , Barry Scholnick , Man Zhang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们的研究表明，强迫资不抵债的消费者债务人偿还更多债务会导致他们战略性地操纵向债权人报告的数据。我们利用政策变化，要求无力偿还债务的债务人在一个任意的收入分界线上增加债务偿还额，我们记录了一些债务人将报告的收入减少到刚好低于这个分界线，以避免更高的偿还额。这些操纵收入的债务人违反还款计划的概率较低，这与他们能够获得隐性收入是一致的。我们估计，这种策略性操纵会使债权人在每次申请中损失 12% 至 36% 的总还款额。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Debtor income manipulation in consumer credit contracts

We show that forcing insolvent consumer debtors to repay a larger fraction of debt causes them to strategically manipulate the data they report to creditors. Exploiting a policy change that required insolvent debtors to increase debt repayments at an arbitrary income cutoff, we document that some debtors reduce reported income to just below this cutoff to avoid the higher repayment. Those debtors who manipulate income have a lower probability of default on their repayment plans, consistent with having access to hidden income. We estimate this strategic manipulation costs creditors 12% to 36% of their total payout per filing.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.