奈特不确定性下的得克萨斯枪战

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.009

Gerrit Bauch , Frank Riedel

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在奈特不确定性条件下，我们研究了一种被广泛使用的解决商业伙伴之间争端的机制，即德克萨斯州的 "枪战"（Texas Shoot-Out）。对于非退化范围的中间估值，模棱两可的分割者会在均衡状态下如实揭示自己的估值。因此，结果是有效的，这与贝叶斯情况相反。在份额相等的情况下，两个代理人都倾向于事先成为选择者，并希望从一开始就避免触发该机制。

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The Texas Shoot-Out under Knightian uncertainty

We investigate a widely used mechanism to resolve disputes among business partners, known as Texas Shoot-Out, under Knightian uncertainty. For a non-degenerate range of intermediate valuations, an ambiguity-averse divider truthfully reveals their valuation in equilibrium. As a consequence, the resulting outcome is efficient, in contrast to the Bayesian case. With equal shares, both agents prefer ex-ante to be the chooser and would like to avoid triggering the mechanism in the first place.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology