为后端 "哆嗦自愿主义 "辩护

Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-30 DOI:10.1111/nous.12501
Laura K. Soter
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引用次数: 0

摘要

信念非自愿论(Doxastic involuntarism)--认为我们对自己的信念状态缺乏直接的自愿控制(针对非秘密原因)--经常被吹捧为哲学正统。在此,我将围绕三个关键问题为 "哆嗦自愿论 "进行新颖的辩护。首先,我指出信念有两个核心功能作用,但关于唯意志论的讨论在很大程度上忽视了对信念指导功能的控制问题。其次,我提出,我们可以通过认知科学对其他相关类似心理状态的控制研究,了解到许多关于哆嗦控制的知识。我借鉴了对 "情绪型状态 "的引导功能的控制机制,并认为这些认知控制机制同样可以用来阻止臆想的引导。这就为我们提供了一种 "后端 "臆想控制的解释,它可以被用于支持 "前端 "信念形成的非正确原因,即非机密原因。第三,我认为,对这种控制的全面的、自我导向的行使可以等同于一种未被充分重视的自愿主义。这种形式的自愿主义适用于任何将指导-实证至少部分地视为信仰的构成要素的信仰论述。最后,我将讨论对这一观点的反对意见及其改进。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A defense of back‐end doxastic voluntarism
Doxastic involuntarism—the thesis that we lack direct voluntary control (in response to non‐evidential reasons) over our belief states—is often touted as philosophical orthodoxy. I here offer a novel defense of doxastic voluntarism, centered around three key moves. First, I point out that belief has two central functional roles, but that discussions of voluntarism have largely ignored questions of control over belief's guidance function. Second, I propose that we can learn much about doxastic control by looking to cognitive scientific research on control over other relevantly similar mental states. I draw on a mechanistic account of control of the guidance function for “emotion‐type states,” and argue that these same cognitive control mechanisms can used to block doxastic guidance. This gives us an account of “back‐end” doxastic control which can be deployed for reasons which are not the right kinds of reasons to support “front‐end” belief formation—i.e., non‐evidential reasons. Third, I argue that comprehensive, self‐directed exercises of this kind of control can amount to an underappreciated kind of voluntarism. This form of voluntarism is available to any account of belief that takes guidance‐instantiation to be at least partly constitutive of believing. Finally, I discuss objections to, and upshots of, the view.
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