双重劳动力市场的风险分担模型

IF 4.3 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Monetary Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-18 DOI:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.103591

{"title":"双重劳动力市场的风险分担模型","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.103591","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In OECD countries, the labor market features a coexistence of open-ended, permanent jobs subject to strict employment protection and fixed-term, temporary jobs. This paper studies a search-and-matching model with risk-averse workers and dynamic employment contracts subject to limited commitment. In equilibrium, permanent and temporary jobs coexist when the match quality is sufficiently dispersed: firing costs generate insurance gains implying that permanent contracts are optimal for high-quality matches. Consistent with recent empirical evidence, quantitative analysis of the model shows that temporary contracts crowd out permanent jobs and do not generate employment gains.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48407,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Monetary Economics","volume":"147 ","pages":"Article 103591"},"PeriodicalIF":4.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393224000448/pdfft?md5=33e0a3aafb25c75485340411756d9354&pid=1-s2.0-S0304393224000448-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A model of risk sharing in a dual labor market\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.103591\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>In OECD countries, the labor market features a coexistence of open-ended, permanent jobs subject to strict employment protection and fixed-term, temporary jobs. This paper studies a search-and-matching model with risk-averse workers and dynamic employment contracts subject to limited commitment. In equilibrium, permanent and temporary jobs coexist when the match quality is sufficiently dispersed: firing costs generate insurance gains implying that permanent contracts are optimal for high-quality matches. Consistent with recent empirical evidence, quantitative analysis of the model shows that temporary contracts crowd out permanent jobs and do not generate employment gains.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48407,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Monetary Economics\",\"volume\":\"147 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103591\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393224000448/pdfft?md5=33e0a3aafb25c75485340411756d9354&pid=1-s2.0-S0304393224000448-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Monetary Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393224000448\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Monetary Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393224000448","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

在经济合作与发展组织（OECD）国家，劳动力市场的特点是受严格就业保护的无限期、永久性工作与定期、临时性工作并存。本文研究的是一个搜索-匹配模型，该模型中的工人是风险规避型的，就业合同是动态的，并受到有限承诺的限制。在均衡状态下，当匹配质量足够分散时，长期工作和临时工作并存：解雇成本产生保险收益，这意味着长期合同是高质量匹配的最优选择。与最近的经验证据一致，对模型的定量分析显示，临时合同会挤占长期工作，不会产生就业收益。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

A model of risk sharing in a dual labor market

In OECD countries, the labor market features a coexistence of open-ended, permanent jobs subject to strict employment protection and fixed-term, temporary jobs. This paper studies a search-and-matching model with risk-averse workers and dynamic employment contracts subject to limited commitment. In equilibrium, permanent and temporary jobs coexist when the match quality is sufficiently dispersed: firing costs generate insurance gains implying that permanent contracts are optimal for high-quality matches. Consistent with recent empirical evidence, quantitative analysis of the model shows that temporary contracts crowd out permanent jobs and do not generate employment gains.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Journal of Monetary Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

7.20

自引率

4.90%

发文量

审稿时长

74 days

期刊介绍： The profession has witnessed over the past twenty years a remarkable expansion of research activities bearing on problems in the broader field of monetary economics. The strong interest in monetary analysis has been increasingly matched in recent years by the growing attention to the working and structure of financial institutions. The role of various institutional arrangements, the consequences of specific changes in banking structure and the welfare aspects of structural policies have attracted an increasing interest in the profession. There has also been a growing attention to the operation of credit markets and to various aspects in the behavior of rates of return on assets. The Journal of Monetary Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of this research.