{"title":"NIMBY 设施公私合作项目中多个利益相关者的行为策略:基于前景理论的三方进化博弈分析","authors":"Xiaotong Cheng, Min Cheng, Yaqun Liu","doi":"10.1139/cjce-2023-0437","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this study, evolutionary game method, prospect theory, and system dynamics (SD) method are combined to analyze the key stakeholders’ behaviors in the public-private partnership (PPP) project of not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) facility. First, the interaction behavior of the public sector, the private sector, and the public and their equilibrium state was analyzed based on the evolutionary game method and prospect theory. Then, the SD method was used to simulate and analyze the impact of different variables on the behavior of the three stakeholders. The results show that the greater the perceived cost difference between the active and negative behavior among the three stakeholders, the more likely they are to take negative behavior. The private sector tends to act opportunistically under low-risk loss situations. Dynamic rewards are more likely to incentivize the public to supervise than high rewards. Some recommendations to promote active behavioral interactions and cooperation among stakeholders were presented accordingly.","PeriodicalId":9414,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Behavioral Strategies of Multiple Stakeholders in the NIMBY Facility Public-Private Partnership Project: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Prospect Theory\",\"authors\":\"Xiaotong Cheng, Min Cheng, Yaqun Liu\",\"doi\":\"10.1139/cjce-2023-0437\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this study, evolutionary game method, prospect theory, and system dynamics (SD) method are combined to analyze the key stakeholders’ behaviors in the public-private partnership (PPP) project of not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) facility. First, the interaction behavior of the public sector, the private sector, and the public and their equilibrium state was analyzed based on the evolutionary game method and prospect theory. Then, the SD method was used to simulate and analyze the impact of different variables on the behavior of the three stakeholders. The results show that the greater the perceived cost difference between the active and negative behavior among the three stakeholders, the more likely they are to take negative behavior. The private sector tends to act opportunistically under low-risk loss situations. Dynamic rewards are more likely to incentivize the public to supervise than high rewards. Some recommendations to promote active behavioral interactions and cooperation among stakeholders were presented accordingly.\",\"PeriodicalId\":9414,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"5\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1139/cjce-2023-0437\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"工程技术\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ENGINEERING, CIVIL\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1139/cjce-2023-0437","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, CIVIL","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Behavioral Strategies of Multiple Stakeholders in the NIMBY Facility Public-Private Partnership Project: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Prospect Theory
In this study, evolutionary game method, prospect theory, and system dynamics (SD) method are combined to analyze the key stakeholders’ behaviors in the public-private partnership (PPP) project of not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) facility. First, the interaction behavior of the public sector, the private sector, and the public and their equilibrium state was analyzed based on the evolutionary game method and prospect theory. Then, the SD method was used to simulate and analyze the impact of different variables on the behavior of the three stakeholders. The results show that the greater the perceived cost difference between the active and negative behavior among the three stakeholders, the more likely they are to take negative behavior. The private sector tends to act opportunistically under low-risk loss situations. Dynamic rewards are more likely to incentivize the public to supervise than high rewards. Some recommendations to promote active behavioral interactions and cooperation among stakeholders were presented accordingly.
期刊介绍:
The Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering is the official journal of the Canadian Society for Civil Engineering. It contains articles on environmental engineering, hydrotechnical engineering, structural engineering, construction engineering, engineering mechanics, engineering materials, and history of civil engineering. Contributors include recognized researchers and practitioners in industry, government, and academia. New developments in engineering design and construction are also featured.