对非正规部门征税:马里巴马科的胁迫对策

IF 2 3区 经济学 Q2 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
Viljar Haavik, Abdoul Wahab Cissé
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引用次数: 0

摘要

近年来的研究表明,低收入国家的非正规工人和企业越来越多地被国家征税。虽然非正规经济部门的税收很少成为重要的收入来源,但在高度非正规化的经济体中,非正规经济部门的税收影响着很大一部分劳动人口。在这种情况下,对非正规经济活动征税是会改善还是会破坏国家与社会的关系,这个问题仍然存在争议,尤其是在脆弱国家,这些国家的税收制度往往对穷人具有高度的强制性。在本文中,我们旨在探讨马里巴马科的非正规经济部门参与者如何以各种方式与当地征税人员进行不同程度的代理互动。马里是一个存在暴力冲突的脆弱国家,经济高度非正规化。在对马里的案例研究中,我们采用了定性研究方法,对非正规经济领域的不同参与者进行了半结构化访谈和焦点小组讨论。我们发现了四种主要的互动模式:(1) "逃税",即个人逃避或尽量减少纳税义务;(2) "税收谈判",即政治资源有限的群体与地方当局进行谈判;(3) "强制征税",即弱势群体在没有实际回报或抗议声音的情况下纳税;(4) 无力纳税或逃税者面临 "严厉制裁"。非正规部门的行为者表现出不同的集体行动能力,这影响了他们对国家当局的代理权。在脆弱国家,需要对非正规部门进行分析,重点了解不同非正规行为者所面临的现有财政压力,以及他们驾驭税收制度的各种策略。税收管理部门应促进对话和建立信任措施,避免采取加剧社会分化和破坏国家与社会关系的策略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Taxing the informal sector: Coping with Coercion in Bamako, Mali

Motivation

In recent years, research has shown that informal workers and businesses in low-income countries are increasingly taxed by the state. While rarely a significant revenue source, informal sector taxation in highly informalized economies affects a large proportion of the working population. Under such circumstances the question of whether taxing informal economic activity either improves or undermines state–society relations are still debated, particularly in the case of fragile states whose tax systems tend to be characterized by a high degree of coercion towards poor actors.

Purpose

Previous research has tended to focus on tax evasion and how to increase tax compliance in the informal economy. In this article, we aim to explore how informal sector actors in Bamako, Mali, interact with local tax collectors in various ways with varying levels of agency. On this basis, we develop a broader analytical framework for understanding local government–taxpayer relations.

Approach and methods

In a case study of Mali, a fragile state with violent conflict and a highly informalized economy, we made use of qualitative research methods with semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with different actors in the informal economy.

Findings

We find four main modes of interaction: (1) “tax evasion,” where individuals evade or minimize their tax obligations; (2) “tax bargaining,” where groups with limited political resources negotiate with local authorities; (3) “forced taxation,” where disadvantaged groups pay taxes without tangible returns or a voice in protest; and (4) “harsh sanctions” faced by those unable to pay or evade taxes. Informal sector actors show a different capacity for collective action impacting their agency vis-à-vis state authorities.

Policy implications

The informal sector needs to be unpacked in fragile states, focusing on understanding existing fiscal pressures on different informal actors and their various strategies for navigating tax systems. Tax administrations should promote dialogue and trust-building measures and avoid strategies that exacerbate social division and undermine state–society relations.

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来源期刊
Development Policy Review
Development Policy Review DEVELOPMENT STUDIES-
CiteScore
3.50
自引率
5.90%
发文量
87
期刊介绍: Development Policy Review is the refereed journal that makes the crucial links between research and policy in international development. Edited by staff of the Overseas Development Institute, the London-based think-tank on international development and humanitarian issues, it publishes single articles and theme issues on topics at the forefront of current development policy debate. Coverage includes the latest thinking and research on poverty-reduction strategies, inequality and social exclusion, property rights and sustainable livelihoods, globalisation in trade and finance, and the reform of global governance. Informed, rigorous, multi-disciplinary and up-to-the-minute, DPR is an indispensable tool for development researchers and practitioners alike.
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