一般寡头垄断均衡中的战略性贸易政策:进口关税案例

IF 1.2 Q3 ECONOMICS
Rudy Colacicco
{"title":"一般寡头垄断均衡中的战略性贸易政策:进口关税案例","authors":"Rudy Colacicco","doi":"10.1016/j.rie.2024.100959","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In a two-country model of general oligopolistic equilibrium with technologically heterogeneous sectors, I study how, in a home-market scenario, a unilateral rise in uniform cross-sector import tariffs affects wages, countrywide profits, and welfare. Firms face resource constraints and wages are simultaneously determined. Economy-wide protectionism reduces the foreign wage without affecting the domestic one. Domestic countrywide profits benefit from a small rise in uniform tariffs, whereas the foreign counterpart is damaged. Domestic welfare is unambiguously hindered. Hence, the general-equilibrium cross-sector perspective goes against the textbook version theory of the optimal tariff in partial equilibrium. Rationalization of these effects suggests a political-economy view on tariff formation in general equilibrium. Then I extend the model to segmented markets, considering uniform specific and ad valorem tariffs for bilateral and unilateral trade policies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46094,"journal":{"name":"Research in Economics","volume":"78 2","pages":"Article 100959"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategic trade policy in general oligopolistic equilibrium: The case of import tariffs\",\"authors\":\"Rudy Colacicco\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.rie.2024.100959\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>In a two-country model of general oligopolistic equilibrium with technologically heterogeneous sectors, I study how, in a home-market scenario, a unilateral rise in uniform cross-sector import tariffs affects wages, countrywide profits, and welfare. Firms face resource constraints and wages are simultaneously determined. Economy-wide protectionism reduces the foreign wage without affecting the domestic one. Domestic countrywide profits benefit from a small rise in uniform tariffs, whereas the foreign counterpart is damaged. Domestic welfare is unambiguously hindered. Hence, the general-equilibrium cross-sector perspective goes against the textbook version theory of the optimal tariff in partial equilibrium. Rationalization of these effects suggests a political-economy view on tariff formation in general equilibrium. Then I extend the model to segmented markets, considering uniform specific and ad valorem tariffs for bilateral and unilateral trade policies.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46094,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Research in Economics\",\"volume\":\"78 2\",\"pages\":\"Article 100959\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Research in Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090944324000231\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Research in Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090944324000231","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

在一个具有技术异质性部门的两国一般寡头垄断均衡模型中,我研究了在本国市场情景下,单边提高跨部门统一进口关税如何影响工资、全国利润和福利。企业面临资源约束,而工资是同时决定的。全经济范围的保护主义会降低国外工资,但不会影响国内工资。国内利润从统一关税的小幅上升中受益,而国外利润则受损。国内福利明确受到阻碍。因此,一般均衡的跨部门视角与教科书版本的局部均衡最优关税理论背道而驰。这些效应的合理化表明了一般均衡中关税形成的政治经济学观点。然后,我将模型扩展到细分市场,考虑双边和单边贸易政策的统一从量税和从价税。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Strategic trade policy in general oligopolistic equilibrium: The case of import tariffs

In a two-country model of general oligopolistic equilibrium with technologically heterogeneous sectors, I study how, in a home-market scenario, a unilateral rise in uniform cross-sector import tariffs affects wages, countrywide profits, and welfare. Firms face resource constraints and wages are simultaneously determined. Economy-wide protectionism reduces the foreign wage without affecting the domestic one. Domestic countrywide profits benefit from a small rise in uniform tariffs, whereas the foreign counterpart is damaged. Domestic welfare is unambiguously hindered. Hence, the general-equilibrium cross-sector perspective goes against the textbook version theory of the optimal tariff in partial equilibrium. Rationalization of these effects suggests a political-economy view on tariff formation in general equilibrium. Then I extend the model to segmented markets, considering uniform specific and ad valorem tariffs for bilateral and unilateral trade policies.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
37
审稿时长
89 days
期刊介绍: Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信