证据论、理由和知识第一

Noûs Pub Date : 2024-04-24 DOI:10.1111/nous.12495
Alexander Bird
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文探讨了证据论、知识第一认识论(尤其是 E=K)与合理性之间的关系。证据论从证据的角度阐述了正当信念,但对证据的性质却只字未提。知识第一告诉我们证据是什么,但需要对正当性做出一致的解释。因此,每一种观点都可以弥补另一种观点的不足。我认为,证据论、(E=K)和一些似是而非的原则结合在一起,就会导致阿格里潘三难所熟悉的怀疑论。我提出了一种证据论知识优先的正当性观点,通过拒绝知识对正当性的 "蕴含 "来避免怀疑论。事实证明,这种结合会产生令人不快的后果。然而,得出这一结论的过程既给证据论者(关于证据可能是什么),也给知识第一论者(关于理由是什么)上了一堂课。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Evidentialism, justification, and knowledge‐first
This paper examines the relationship between evidentialism, knowledge‐first epistemology, (E=K) in particular, and justification. Evidentialism gives an account of justified belief in terms of evidence but is silent on the nature of evidence. Knowledge‐first tells us what evidence is but stands in need of an agreed account of justification. So each might be able to supply what the other lacks. I argue that the combination of evidentialism, (E=K), and some plausible principles leads to the scepticism familiar from the Agrippan trilemma. I develop an Evidentialist Knowledge‐First view of justification that avoids scepticism by rejecting the entailment of justification by knowledge. This combination turns out to have unpalatable consequences. Nonetheless, the process of reaching that conclusion teaches lessons both to the evidentialist (regarding what evidence could be) and to the knowledge‐firster (regarding what justification is).
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