小公司的代理成本更高?规模和报告要求在代理冲突中的作用

IF 3.4 3区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT
Pauline Johannes, Vivien Lefebvre
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们的论文研究了私有企业所有权和控制权分离所导致的纵向代理冲突。纵向代理冲突会导致由担保成本、监督成本和剩余损失产生的纵向代理成本。更具体地说,我们关注公司规模和公司报告要求在这些成本水平中的作用。我们证明,规模较小的私人控股公司的纵向代理成本较高,因为股东的监督能力较弱,进入劳动力市场的机会有限。此外,在报告要求相对较弱的国家,小公司的纵向代理成本也会放大,因为股东可用于评估经理人行为的信息较少。我们首次提出,公司规模以及审计和报告要求的力度对于理解私人控股公司的代理成本规模至关重要。我们的分析还使我们对解释私人控股公司代理成本的因素有了更全面的了解。因此,本研究对公共政策具有重要意义,因为披露要求是许多国家面临的一个重大问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Higher agency costs in smaller firms? The role of size and reporting requirements in agency conflicts
Our paper investigates vertical agency conflicts that result from the separation of ownership and control in privately held firms. Vertical agency conflicts can lead to vertical agency costs resulting from bonding costs, monitoring costs, and residual losses. More specifically, we focus on the roles of firm size and corporate reporting requirements in the level of these costs. We demonstrate that vertical agency costs are higher in smaller, privately held firms because shareholders have less monitoring capacity and limited access to the labor market. Furthermore, vertical agency costs in smaller firms are amplified in countries characterized by relatively weaker reporting requirements because shareholders have less information available to assess managers' actions. We suggest for the first time that firm size and strength of auditing and reporting requirements are essential to understanding agency costs' magnitude in privately held firms. Our analysis also offers a more comprehensive understanding of the factors that explain agency costs in privately held firms. Thus, this study poses important implications for public policy, as disclosure requirements are a major issue for many countries.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.20
自引率
13.50%
发文量
52
期刊介绍: The European Management Review is an international journal dedicated to advancing the understanding of management in private and public sector organizations through empirical investigation and theoretical analysis. The European Management Review provides an international forum for dialogue between researchers, thereby improving the understanding of the nature of management in different settings and promoting the transfer of research results to management practice. Although one of the European Management Review"s aims is to foster the general advancement of management scholarship among European scholars and/or those academics interested in European management issues.
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