绿色债务市场的流动性和客户效应

IF 7.2 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-04-12 DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102582

Dion Bongaerts , Dirk Schoenmaker

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们共同模拟了绿色债券市场和普通债券市场。绿色债券可以提高分配效率，降低绿色项目的融资成本，但规模经济（如流动性分散）可能会造成摩擦。因此，有利可图且能提高福利的项目，无论是绿色项目还是棕色项目，都可能在均衡状态下被配给。在气候投资者短缺、大量非货币补偿和/或成本高昂的分散化情况下，会出现绿色项目的配给。普通项目的配给可能发生在普通投资者短缺的情况下，也可能发生在利润丰厚的情况下，即当利润更高的绿色项目挤掉普通项目时。我们提出了另一种安全设计方案，既保留了绿色专用性，又防止了分散性。

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Liquidity and clientele effects in green debt markets

We jointly model green and regular bond markets. Green bonds can improve allocative efficiency and lower financing costs for green projects, but economies of scale, like liquidity fragmentation, may cause friction. Consequently, profitable and welfare-enhancing projects, green and brown, can be rationed in equilibrium. Rationing green projects happens with a shortage of climate investors, large non-monetary offsets, and/or costly fragmentation. Rationing regular projects can happen with a shortage of regular investors, but also with an abundance, when more profitable green projects crowd out regular ones. We propose an alternative security design that preserves green earmarking but prevents fragmentation.

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来源期刊

Journal of Corporate Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.80

自引率

3.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.