快递:团体还是个人销售激励?什么最适合品牌管理的零售销售业务?

IF 11.5 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Wenshu Zhang, Jia Li, Subramanian Balachander
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究对品牌管理零售(BMR)业务中的销售人员激励报酬进行了研究,这种业务在高端百货商店和垂直整合零售商中尤为普遍。研究特别探讨了品牌实力如何影响品牌在 BMR 环境中使用个人激励与集体激励对销售人员的相对收益。作者利用一个委托代理理论模型对这一问题进行了研究,该模型由一个风险中性的公司和多个规避风险的销售人员组成。有趣的是,他们发现群体激励对弱势品牌比对强势品牌更有利。此外,作者还通过分析两种不同情况下的 BMR 业务的销售报酬数据,为他们的理论发现提供了经验支持。研究结果表明,在决定最佳销售人员薪酬结构时,管理者应考虑品牌的实力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
EXPRESS: Group or Individual Sales Incentives? What Is Best for Brand-Managed Retail Sales Operations?
This research studies sales force incentive compensation in Brand-Managed Retail (BMR) operations, which are particularly prevalent in high-end department stores and vertically integrated retailers. In particular, the research explores how a brand’s strength may affect the relative benefit to a brand from using individual versus group incentives for motivating its salespeople in BMR settings. The authors investigate this issue using a theoretical principal-agent model consisting of a risk-neutral firm employing multiple risk-averse salespeople. Interestingly, they find that a group incentive is more beneficial to a weaker brand than to a stronger one. Furthermore, the authors find empirical support for their theoretical findings from an analysis of sales compensation data from BMR operations in two different settings. The research findings suggest that managers should factor in the brand’s strength when deciding on the optimal salesperson compensation structure in BMR settings.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
24.10
自引率
5.40%
发文量
49
期刊介绍: Founded in 1936,the Journal of Marketing (JM) serves as a premier outlet for substantive research in marketing. JM is dedicated to developing and disseminating knowledge about real-world marketing questions, catering to scholars, educators, managers, policy makers, consumers, and other global societal stakeholders. Over the years,JM has played a crucial role in shaping the content and boundaries of the marketing discipline.
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