{"title":"新闻一小时地方电视新闻市场的福利估算","authors":"Matthew J. Baker, Lisa M. George","doi":"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103068","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We estimate the welfare consequences of local news broadcasting decisions in advertiser-funded television, a central question in media regulation. We model programming decisions as the outcome of a discrete game played by rival stations competing for advertising revenue (which depends on viewing) by choosing lineups of local news and entertainment broadcasts. Using program-level data on television viewing and advertising prices, we find modest under-provision of local news relative to the level that maximizes television viewing. Counterfactual simulations indicate an average deficit of 7.4 broadcasts per market, or 12.8% of local station broadcasts during the evening news hours. Most of this shortfall is in the 7:30 timeslot leading into prime time. We distinguish two sources of inefficiency: losses due to advertiser valuation of local news and entertainment viewers, and losses from classic business stealing. Losses from competition represent about one third of the estimated shortfall, suggesting gains to cooperation among competing stations.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48127,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","volume":"94 ","pages":"Article 103068"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The news hour: Welfare estimation in the market for local television news\",\"authors\":\"Matthew J. Baker, Lisa M. George\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.ijindorg.2024.103068\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We estimate the welfare consequences of local news broadcasting decisions in advertiser-funded television, a central question in media regulation. We model programming decisions as the outcome of a discrete game played by rival stations competing for advertising revenue (which depends on viewing) by choosing lineups of local news and entertainment broadcasts. Using program-level data on television viewing and advertising prices, we find modest under-provision of local news relative to the level that maximizes television viewing. Counterfactual simulations indicate an average deficit of 7.4 broadcasts per market, or 12.8% of local station broadcasts during the evening news hours. Most of this shortfall is in the 7:30 timeslot leading into prime time. We distinguish two sources of inefficiency: losses due to advertiser valuation of local news and entertainment viewers, and losses from classic business stealing. Losses from competition represent about one third of the estimated shortfall, suggesting gains to cooperation among competing stations.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48127,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Industrial Organization\",\"volume\":\"94 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103068\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-04-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Industrial Organization\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000237\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Industrial Organization","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718724000237","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The news hour: Welfare estimation in the market for local television news
We estimate the welfare consequences of local news broadcasting decisions in advertiser-funded television, a central question in media regulation. We model programming decisions as the outcome of a discrete game played by rival stations competing for advertising revenue (which depends on viewing) by choosing lineups of local news and entertainment broadcasts. Using program-level data on television viewing and advertising prices, we find modest under-provision of local news relative to the level that maximizes television viewing. Counterfactual simulations indicate an average deficit of 7.4 broadcasts per market, or 12.8% of local station broadcasts during the evening news hours. Most of this shortfall is in the 7:30 timeslot leading into prime time. We distinguish two sources of inefficiency: losses due to advertiser valuation of local news and entertainment viewers, and losses from classic business stealing. Losses from competition represent about one third of the estimated shortfall, suggesting gains to cooperation among competing stations.
期刊介绍：
The IJIO is an international venture that aims at full coverage of theoretical and empirical questions in industrial organization. This includes classic questions of strategic behavior and market structure. The journal also seeks to publish articles dealing with technological change, internal organization of firms, regulation, antitrust and productivity analysis. We recognize the need to allow for diversity of perspectives and research styles in industrial organization and we encourage submissions in theoretical work, empirical work, and case studies. The journal will also occasionally publish symposia on topical issues.
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