具有异质先验的拍卖设计

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-04-10 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.002

Hien Pham , Takuro Yamashita

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑的是一个具有私人价值的拍卖设计问题，在这个问题中，卖方和竞标者可能对自己的价值（可能是相关的）有不同的先验。每个投标人都会根据自己的先验值形成对其他人的（临时）信念，而先验值是通过观察自己的价值更新的。如果卖方面临投标人先验的不确定性，即使他知道投标人的先验与他的先验在任何给定的距离之内，他也会发现在最坏的情况下，提出占优策略拍卖机制是最优的。

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Auction design with heterogeneous priors

We consider an auction design problem with private values, where the seller and bidders may enjoy heterogeneous priors about their (possibly correlated) valuations. Each bidder forms an (interim) belief about the others based on his own prior updated by observing his own value. If the seller faces uncertainty about the bidders' priors, even if he knows that the bidders' priors are within any given distance from his, he may find it worst-case optimal to propose a dominant-strategy auction mechanism.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology