一个实质主义的例子:美国的发现

Anton Adămuț
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引用次数: 0

摘要

康德的目标是实现科学的形而上学,而卡米尔-佩特雷斯库则是形而上学的科学。他们都不会实现自己的目标,只是前者有失败的意识,后者最终会达到良知的失败。但是,失败的形而上学不仅仅是失败的形而上学。在这里,他们两人都得到了拯救。康德,这个 "毁灭一切者",这个否定者,这个 "普鲁士休谟",从科学 "跌入 "信仰。卡米尔-佩特列斯库也堕落了,但他用科学的连续理念取代了信仰。他从科学跌入科学,跌入关于世界的全部科学或关于物质的科学。这样的科学,其意义将像具体事物的意义一样,通过添加的方式逐步实现。卡米尔从一开始就明确地脱离了他所谓的 "理性主义哲学",即他所理解的古典体系(尤其是康德和黑格尔体系)。责难?对于未来的实体主义哲学来说,这是一个根本性的问题:这类理性主义哲学只能被怀疑拥有具体的概念,而绝不可能拥有这一概念的现实性。理性主义以抽象的形式拥有 "另一个",而实质主义则以同时现实的形式拥有它。卡米尔-佩特雷斯库想要证明的事实是,现实缺乏逻辑性,或者至少,现实摆脱了经典逻辑。康德和黑格尔都用一种方案捕捉现实,僵化现实,赋予现实逻辑,从而恰恰抵消了现实的本质特征:具体性。逻辑主义转化为对现实的异端不忠。这样,具体就成了为自我而存在的事实,而不是存在的事实。我试图通过把它们应用到知识理论中来分析这一切,因为知识理论出现在 "实质论 "的一个插曲中,即发现美洲的插曲中。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
UN EXEMPLU SUBSTANȚIALIST: DESCOPERIREA AMERICII
Kant aims to achieve a scientific metaphysics; Camil Petrescu rather a metaphysical science. Neither of them will achieve anything of what they set out to do, only that, while the first one has the consciousness of failure, the second one will eventually reach a failure of conscience. But the metaphysics of failure is more than just a failed metaphysics. Here both of them are saved. Kant, the “all-destroyer”, the negator, this “Prussian Hume”, “falls” from science into faith. Camil Petrescu falls as well, but replaces faith with the successive idea of science. He falls from science to science, in the totality of science about the world or in the science of substance. Such a science, whose meaning will be realized, like that of the concrete, along the way, progressively, by addition. Camil detaches himself from the beginning and definitively from what he calls “rationalist philosophy”, by which he understands classical systems (especially Kantian and Hegelian ones). The reproach? It is a fundamental one for the future substantialist philosophy: this type of rationalist philosophy can only be suspected of being in possession of the notion of the concrete and in no way in possession of the reality of this concept. Rationalism has the “other” one in the form of abstraction; substantialism has it in the form of simultaneous reality. What Camil Petrescu wants to demonstrate is the fact that reality lacks logic or, at least, reality escapes from classic logic. Both Kant and Hegel capture reality in a scheme, ossifies it, they give it logic, thereby canceling out precisely what characterizes it essentially: the concrete. Logicism translates into a heretical infidelity to the real. The concrete thus becomes the fact of being for self, not of existing. All this I try to analyze by applying them to the theory of knowledge as it appears in an episode of the Doctrine of Substance, the episode of the discovery of America.
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