{"title":"完全不同的游戏\":海军陆战队与北约在挪威北极地区的演习,1978-86 年","authors":"Brian Donlon","doi":"10.35318/mch.2023090203","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. Marine Corps consistently delivered substandard performance during training exercises in the Arctic in the late 1970s to mid-1980s. An examination of archival records, journal articles, student papers, and interviews with participants provides two explanations for the long period in which Marines were regarded as “rather poor winter warriors.” First, to overcome the challenges of Arctic operations, the Marine Corps had to make sustained, often slow, improvement in the three-step process of learning to survive, move, and fight in the Arctic. Second, the Corps’ culture simultaneously hamstrung and accelerated improvement in this Arctic trinity. Ultimately, the Corps’ slow road to success in the Arctic highlights the dependence of strategic change on proficiency at the lowest tactical levels.","PeriodicalId":489021,"journal":{"name":"Marine Corps history","volume":"26 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An \\\"Entirely Different Ballgame\\\": The Marine Corps and NATO Exercises in Artic Norway, 1978-86\",\"authors\":\"Brian Donlon\",\"doi\":\"10.35318/mch.2023090203\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The U.S. Marine Corps consistently delivered substandard performance during training exercises in the Arctic in the late 1970s to mid-1980s. An examination of archival records, journal articles, student papers, and interviews with participants provides two explanations for the long period in which Marines were regarded as “rather poor winter warriors.” First, to overcome the challenges of Arctic operations, the Marine Corps had to make sustained, often slow, improvement in the three-step process of learning to survive, move, and fight in the Arctic. Second, the Corps’ culture simultaneously hamstrung and accelerated improvement in this Arctic trinity. Ultimately, the Corps’ slow road to success in the Arctic highlights the dependence of strategic change on proficiency at the lowest tactical levels.\",\"PeriodicalId\":489021,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Marine Corps history\",\"volume\":\"26 5\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Marine Corps history\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"0\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2023090203\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Marine Corps history","FirstCategoryId":"0","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.35318/mch.2023090203","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
An "Entirely Different Ballgame": The Marine Corps and NATO Exercises in Artic Norway, 1978-86
The U.S. Marine Corps consistently delivered substandard performance during training exercises in the Arctic in the late 1970s to mid-1980s. An examination of archival records, journal articles, student papers, and interviews with participants provides two explanations for the long period in which Marines were regarded as “rather poor winter warriors.” First, to overcome the challenges of Arctic operations, the Marine Corps had to make sustained, often slow, improvement in the three-step process of learning to survive, move, and fight in the Arctic. Second, the Corps’ culture simultaneously hamstrung and accelerated improvement in this Arctic trinity. Ultimately, the Corps’ slow road to success in the Arctic highlights the dependence of strategic change on proficiency at the lowest tactical levels.