不确定性下的沟通与创始人信息优势的作用:来自 SPAC IPO 的证据

IF 2.9 Q2 MANAGEMENT
I. Naumovska, Derek Harmon
{"title":"不确定性下的沟通与创始人信息优势的作用:来自 SPAC IPO 的证据","authors":"I. Naumovska, Derek Harmon","doi":"10.1287/stsc.2022.0043","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This study develops a novel framework about how a firm’s financing outcome will be shaped by its communication under different types of uncertainty. Whereas prior work has largely focused on uncertainties that arise because of founders having a knowledge advantage over investors, we examine a firm’s communication in situations of more fundamental uncertainty when both founders and investors face knowledge problems. Our framework proposes that in situations where founders have a knowledge advantage over investors (i.e., when there is information asymmetry), firms that reduce uncertainty by sending signals of quality and express less uncertainty in their communications will enjoy better financing outcomes. However, we argue that in situations characterized by high unknowability, and where founders do not have a significant knowledge advantage over investors (i.e., when there is Knightian uncertainty), firms that acknowledge this unknowability by expressing more uncertainty in their communications will have more favorable financing outcomes. Studying the full population of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) that sought to complete an initial public offering from the emergence of the sector in 2003–2019, we find support for our predictions. This study expands our understanding of the role of uncertainty in investment decisions, offers deeper insight into how language operates in financial markets, and sheds light on the increasingly popular, but understudied, SPAC vehicle. Funding: Ivana Naumovska received financial support from the INSEAD R&D Committee and the INSEAD Dean’s Annual Fund. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2022.0043 .","PeriodicalId":45295,"journal":{"name":"Strategy Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Communication under Uncertainty and the Role of Founders’ Information Advantage: Evidence from SPAC IPOs\",\"authors\":\"I. Naumovska, Derek Harmon\",\"doi\":\"10.1287/stsc.2022.0043\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This study develops a novel framework about how a firm’s financing outcome will be shaped by its communication under different types of uncertainty. Whereas prior work has largely focused on uncertainties that arise because of founders having a knowledge advantage over investors, we examine a firm’s communication in situations of more fundamental uncertainty when both founders and investors face knowledge problems. Our framework proposes that in situations where founders have a knowledge advantage over investors (i.e., when there is information asymmetry), firms that reduce uncertainty by sending signals of quality and express less uncertainty in their communications will enjoy better financing outcomes. However, we argue that in situations characterized by high unknowability, and where founders do not have a significant knowledge advantage over investors (i.e., when there is Knightian uncertainty), firms that acknowledge this unknowability by expressing more uncertainty in their communications will have more favorable financing outcomes. Studying the full population of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) that sought to complete an initial public offering from the emergence of the sector in 2003–2019, we find support for our predictions. This study expands our understanding of the role of uncertainty in investment decisions, offers deeper insight into how language operates in financial markets, and sheds light on the increasingly popular, but understudied, SPAC vehicle. Funding: Ivana Naumovska received financial support from the INSEAD R&D Committee and the INSEAD Dean’s Annual Fund. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2022.0043 .\",\"PeriodicalId\":45295,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Strategy Science\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-02-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Strategy Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2022.0043\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"MANAGEMENT\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Strategy Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2022.0043","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究建立了一个新颖的框架,说明在不同类型的不确定性情况下,企业的沟通会如何影响其融资结果。以往的研究主要集中于创始人相对于投资者具有知识优势而产生的不确定性,而我们研究的是在创始人和投资者都面临知识问题的情况下,企业在更基本的不确定性情况下的沟通。我们的框架认为,在创始人相对于投资者具有知识优势的情况下(即存在信息不对称时),通过发出高质量信号来减少不确定性并在沟通中表达较少不确定性的公司将获得更好的融资结果。然而,我们认为,在高度不可知性的情况下,创始人相对于投资者没有明显的知识优势(即存在奈特不确定性时),通过在沟通中表达更多不确定性来承认这种不可知性的公司将获得更有利的融资结果。通过对 2003-2019 年特殊目的收购公司(SPAC)兴起期间寻求完成首次公开募股的全部公司进行研究,我们发现我们的预测得到了支持。这项研究拓展了我们对不确定性在投资决策中的作用的理解,深入揭示了金融市场中的语言运作方式,并揭示了日益流行但研究不足的 SPAC 工具。资助:Ivana Naumovska 获得了欧洲工商管理学院研发委员会和欧洲工商管理学院院长年度基金的资助。补充材料:在线附录见 https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2022.0043 。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Communication under Uncertainty and the Role of Founders’ Information Advantage: Evidence from SPAC IPOs
This study develops a novel framework about how a firm’s financing outcome will be shaped by its communication under different types of uncertainty. Whereas prior work has largely focused on uncertainties that arise because of founders having a knowledge advantage over investors, we examine a firm’s communication in situations of more fundamental uncertainty when both founders and investors face knowledge problems. Our framework proposes that in situations where founders have a knowledge advantage over investors (i.e., when there is information asymmetry), firms that reduce uncertainty by sending signals of quality and express less uncertainty in their communications will enjoy better financing outcomes. However, we argue that in situations characterized by high unknowability, and where founders do not have a significant knowledge advantage over investors (i.e., when there is Knightian uncertainty), firms that acknowledge this unknowability by expressing more uncertainty in their communications will have more favorable financing outcomes. Studying the full population of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) that sought to complete an initial public offering from the emergence of the sector in 2003–2019, we find support for our predictions. This study expands our understanding of the role of uncertainty in investment decisions, offers deeper insight into how language operates in financial markets, and sheds light on the increasingly popular, but understudied, SPAC vehicle. Funding: Ivana Naumovska received financial support from the INSEAD R&D Committee and the INSEAD Dean’s Annual Fund. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2022.0043 .
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Strategy Science
Strategy Science MANAGEMENT-
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
5.10%
发文量
31
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信