与制造商共享需求预测信息

fujun Hou, Yan Yan, Huimin Zhang
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摘要

在供应链中,上游制造商和下游零售商都拥有私人需求预测信息,本研究探讨了制造商蚕食战略和零售商信息共享战略之间的相互作用。制造商可以选择建立直销渠道来蚕食终端市场,而零售商则可以决定是否与制造商共享私人信息。我们考虑了四种情况,并推导出相应的企业均衡结果。理论研究结果表明,当制造商选择不蚕食市场时,制造商和零售商都不会自愿共享需求信息。相反,如果制造商侵占,他们会在一定条件下达成信息共享协议。一旦达成这种协议,制造商就能从侵占中获得更多利益。如果不能实现信息共享,制造商只有在其单位直销成本低于某一临界值时才会侵占。此外,渠道之间的激烈竞争也会鼓励制造商侵占。在上述研究的基础上,我们进行了数值研究,分析了预测准确性对制造商、零售商和整个供应链的利润和信息共享价值的影响。这些结果为企业提供了宝贵的管理启示。例如,预测准确度的提高对两家公司都有利。此外,随着渠道替代率的提高,不仅制造商蚕食的可能性增加,而且制造商和整个供应链也会从中获得更多利润。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Demand forecast information sharing with manufacturer encroachment
This study explores the interplay between the manufacturer’s encroachment strategy and the retailer’s information sharing strategy in a supply chain, wherein both the upstream manufacturer and downstream retailer possess private demand forecast information. The manufacturer has the option to establish a direct selling channel to encroach on the end market, and the retailer can decide whether to share private information with the manufacturer. We consider four scenarios and derive the corresponding equilibrium outcomes of firms. Theoretical research results show that when the manufacturer opts not to encroach, neither the manufacturer nor the retailer will voluntarily share their demand information. In contrast, if the manufacturer encroaches, they will reach an information sharing agreement under certain conditions. Once such an agreement is reached, the manufacturer can benefit more from encroachment. If information sharing is not achieved, the manufacturer encroaches only if his unit direct selling cost is lower than a certain threshold. In addition, fierce competition among channels encourages the manufacturer to encroach. Based on the abovementioned works, we conduct numerical studies to analyze the impact of forecast accuracy on the profits and information sharing value of the manufacturer, the retailer and the whole supply chain. These results offer valuable management insights for firms. For example, the improved forecast accuracy is beneficial to both firms. Moreover, as the channel substitution rate increases, not only the possibility of manufacturer encroachment increases, but both the manufacturer and the whole supply chain also get more profits from it.
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