{"title":"石油国家、石油冲击和政权更迭:委内瑞拉和厄瓜多尔,2013-2023 年","authors":"Katrina Burgess, Javier Corrales","doi":"10.1177/27538796241237287","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The literature on petrostates tends to blackbox the state. We argue, in contrast, that not all petro-states are configured equally. They thus respond to external crises differently. Despite sharing similar background conditions, the petro-state of Venezuela responded to the external oil shock of 2014–2015 by turning more authoritarian and predatory, whereas the petro-state of Ecuador tried to become more democratic and developmental. To explain this difference, we focus on three within-state institutional differences between these cases: the cohesion of hardliners, the reach of the coercive military and paramilitary apparatus, and the viability of the public and private sectors. In short, even petro-states operating under similar regimes (in this case, left-populist, semi-authoritarian) can exhibit different institutional make-ups, and these institutional differences help explain responses to similar external shocks.","PeriodicalId":513221,"journal":{"name":"Environment and Security","volume":"125 44","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Petro-states, oil shocks, and regime change: Venezuela and Ecuador, 2013–2023\",\"authors\":\"Katrina Burgess, Javier Corrales\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/27538796241237287\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The literature on petrostates tends to blackbox the state. We argue, in contrast, that not all petro-states are configured equally. They thus respond to external crises differently. Despite sharing similar background conditions, the petro-state of Venezuela responded to the external oil shock of 2014–2015 by turning more authoritarian and predatory, whereas the petro-state of Ecuador tried to become more democratic and developmental. To explain this difference, we focus on three within-state institutional differences between these cases: the cohesion of hardliners, the reach of the coercive military and paramilitary apparatus, and the viability of the public and private sectors. In short, even petro-states operating under similar regimes (in this case, left-populist, semi-authoritarian) can exhibit different institutional make-ups, and these institutional differences help explain responses to similar external shocks.\",\"PeriodicalId\":513221,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Environment and Security\",\"volume\":\"125 44\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Environment and Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/27538796241237287\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Environment and Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/27538796241237287","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Petro-states, oil shocks, and regime change: Venezuela and Ecuador, 2013–2023
The literature on petrostates tends to blackbox the state. We argue, in contrast, that not all petro-states are configured equally. They thus respond to external crises differently. Despite sharing similar background conditions, the petro-state of Venezuela responded to the external oil shock of 2014–2015 by turning more authoritarian and predatory, whereas the petro-state of Ecuador tried to become more democratic and developmental. To explain this difference, we focus on three within-state institutional differences between these cases: the cohesion of hardliners, the reach of the coercive military and paramilitary apparatus, and the viability of the public and private sectors. In short, even petro-states operating under similar regimes (in this case, left-populist, semi-authoritarian) can exhibit different institutional make-ups, and these institutional differences help explain responses to similar external shocks.