美国政治腐败与劳动力投资（低）效率

IF 5.5 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Global Finance Journal Pub Date : 2024-03-28 DOI:10.1016/j.gfj.2024.100962

Hasibul Chowdhury , Timothy Estreich , Ashrafee Hossain , Jiayi Zheng

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了政治腐败对企业劳动力投资效率的影响。我们发现，总部位于腐败程度较高地区的企业劳动力投资效率较低。在腐败程度较高的环境中，由于信息不透明以及需要保护自己的资产，企业的监督力度较弱，这促使它们采取低效的劳动力投资政策。这些结果对遗漏变量偏差、选择偏差和其他内生性问题的考虑是稳健的。本研究表明，政治腐败会导致企业偏离最佳劳动力投资决策，因此对社会，尤其是对员工具有广泛的影响。

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U.S. Political corruption and labor investment (in)efficiency

This study examines the impact of political corruption on firm labor investment efficiency. We find that firms headquartered in areas with higher levels of corruption have more inefficient levels of labor investment. Firms in more corrupt environments have weaker monitoring brought about by information opacity as well as a need to shield their assets, which prompts them to adopt inefficient labor investment policies. These results are robust to considerations of omitted variable bias, selection bias, and other endogeneity concerns. The present research has broad implications for society, particularly employees, as it shows that political corruption causes firms to deviate from optimal labor investment decisions.

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来源期刊

Global Finance Journal BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

7.30

自引率

13.50%

发文量

106

审稿时长

53 days

期刊介绍： Global Finance Journal provides a forum for the exchange of ideas and techniques among academicians and practitioners and, thereby, advances applied research in global financial management. Global Finance Journal publishes original, creative, scholarly research that integrates theory and practice and addresses a readership in both business and academia. Articles reflecting pragmatic research are sought in areas such as financial management, investment, banking and financial services, accounting, and taxation. Global Finance Journal welcomes contributions from scholars in both the business and academic community and encourages collaborative research from this broad base worldwide.