计划生育与生育率不平等:中国取消独生子女政策的证据

IF 1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Nana Chen, Hangtian Xu, Yang Xu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究以中国的独生子女政策(OCP)--一项广为人知的计划生育政策干预--为例,说明基于收入的超限额生育处罚计划可能会导致生育不平等。根据独生子女政策,一对夫妇只能合法生育一个孩子,超过配额者将被罚款。为了确保这一惩罚计划不会偏颇地只影响对一定数额罚款相对更敏感的低收入人群,该计划被设计为以收入为基础,这使得富人与穷人的感知成本相等。然而,我们发现,由于经济处罚的有限责任性质,它无意中造成了有利于穷人的生育不平等。根据城市年面板数据,我们发现这一机制在一定程度上解释了 OCP 时代富裕城市较低的出生率;OCP 取消后,这一差距迅速缩小。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Family planning and fertility inequality: Evidence from the abolition of China's one-child policy

This study takes China's one-child policy (OCP)—a widely known policy intervention for family planning—as an example to illustrate that an income-based penalty scheme for above-quota births may cause fertility inequality. A couple can legally have only one child under the OCP, and those who exceed the quota are subject to fines. To ensure that this penalty scheme does not biasedly affect only low-income people who are relatively more sensitive to fines of a certain amount, it was designed to be income-based, which makes the perceived cost of the rich equal to that of the poor. However, we find that due to the limited liability nature of the financial penalty, it unintentionally created fertility inequality that favors the poor. Relying on city-year-level panel data, we find that this mechanism partly explains the lower birth rates in rich cities in the OCP era; the gap narrowed rapidly after the OCP abolition.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
7.70%
发文量
19
期刊介绍: The Asian Economic Journal provides detailed coverage of a wide range of topics in economics relating to East Asia, including investigation of current research, international comparisons and country studies. It is a forum for debate amongst theorists, practitioners and researchers and publishes high-quality theoretical, empirical and policy orientated contributions. The Asian Economic Journal facilitates the exchange of information among researchers on a world-wide basis and offers a unique opportunity for economists to keep abreast of research on economics pertaining to East Asia.
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