农业债务和自然资本的过度开发

IF 2.6 3区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Resource and Energy Economics Pub Date : 2024-03-24 DOI:10.1016/j.reseneeco.2024.101439

Graeme Guthrie

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文使用随机最优控制模型来说明标准贷款合同如何激励农民关注短期财务业绩，而牺牲农场的长期自然资本。这些激励是债务悬置问题的一种表现形式。对这一模型的扩展表明，与可持续发展挂钩的贷款可以用来削弱这些激励因素，从而使农民及其银行家潜在受益。这些贷款产生的经济效益的大小取决于农场的特点。本文研究了可持续性挂钩贷款的最佳设计。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Farm debt and the over-exploitation of natural capital

This paper uses a stochastic optimal control model to show how standard loan contracts create incentives for farmers to focus on short-term financial performance at the expense of farms’ long-term natural capital. These incentives are a manifestation of the debt overhang problem. Extending this model shows how sustainability-linked loans can be used to weaken these incentives in a way that potentially benefits farmers and their bankers. The magnitude of the economic benefits generated by these loans depends on farm characteristics. The paper investigates the optimal design of sustainability-linked loans.

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来源期刊

Resource and Energy Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

5.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Resource and Energy Economics provides a forum for high level economic analysis of utilization and development of the earth natural resources. The subject matter encompasses questions of optimal production and consumption affecting energy, minerals, land, air and water, and includes analysis of firm and industry behavior, environmental issues and public policies. Implications for both developed and developing countries are of concern. The journal publishes high quality papers for an international audience. Innovative energy, resource and environmental analyses, including theoretical models and empirical studies are appropriate for publication in Resource and Energy Economics.